Andrews Family Holdings Pty Ltd v Yellow Tractor Pty Ltd  VSC 682 (8 November 2017); Andrews Family Holdings Pty Ltd v Yellow Tractor Pty Ltd (No 2)  VSC 695 (14 November 2017). Ginnane J.
Mr Annesley entered a contract to purchase land from the plaintiff (“Andrews”). In purported payment of the balance of price he tendered a document entitled ‘Promissory Note’ which was neither a permitted method of payment nor indeed in law a promissory note. Andrews rescinded the contract. The defendant (“the company”), of which Annesley was a director and which he had intended to nominate as purchaser, subsequently caveated, the caveatable interest being based on the rescinded contract. The company was subsequently deregistered. Andrews applied to remove this caveat under the TLA s. 90(3). Ginnane J:
- Found no serious question to be tried that the company, even if still registered, had a caveatable interest: it was not a party to the contract and had no legal or equitable interest in the property.
- Also enjoined Annesley from lodging further caveats in respect of the land without leave. He noted that there was both authority for this course in the caveat context, ie Maryvell Investments Pty Ltd v Velissaris  VSC 19, and the general curial power to grant injunctions given by the Supreme Court Act 1986 s. 37. This case merited an injunction because Annesley had already lodged two caveats and did not foreswear lodging more.
Undaunted, on the day after this decision Annesley caveated in his own name claiming a purchaser’s lien. The Titles Office had a copy of the court order but accepted the caveat albeit apparently issuing a requisition requiring Annesley to establish within 14 days that he had the court’s leave. On an application for removal if this caveat Land Use Victoria argued that it had justifiably given Annesley ‘the benefit of the doubt’, the Registrar having a duty to accept a caveat for lodgment. Ginnane J:
- Held this practice of giving the benefit of the doubt inappropriate for caveators whose previous caveats had been removed or had lapsed or were now subject to injunction. The Registrar’s statutory obligations included giving effect to directions of the Supreme Court (TLA s. 103).
- Permanently enjoined Annesley from lodging caveats in respect of the property, with indemnity costs.
- Enjoined the Registrar of Titles so that must forthwith reject and not record any caveat by Annesley over the property.
Commentary: This case is a rare case of the Registrar registering a caveat after an injunction was granted. Otherwise, it succeeds previous cases such as where: the court orders the Registrar not to register any caveat without its leave or further order (Westpac Banking Corporation v Chilver  VSC 587), or any caveat by any person other than a purchaser from the successful plaintiff without its leave for a certain period (Lettieri v Gajic  VSC 378) or enjoins the lodging of further caveats (Marchesi v Vasiliou  VSC 213; Wells v Rouse & Ors  VSC 533).
Tawafi v Weil  VSC 643 (21 August 2017) Digby J.
Section 90(1)(e) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a caveat lapses as to land affected by a transfer upon the expiration of thirty days after notice by the Registrar that a transfer has been lodged for registration. If within this period the caveator appears before a court and gives an undertaking or security the court may direct the Registrar to delay registration for a further period, or may make such other order as is just (s. 90(2)). If the Registrar is of opinion that the doing of any act is necessary or desirable, then, if the act is not done within such time as the Registrar allows, the Registrar may refuse to proceed with any registration (s. 105(a)).
The timeline was –
11 April 2017 Plaintiff enters contract to purchase certain land.
30 May Defendant caveats on the grounds of “part performed oral agreement” et cetera with the registered proprietor.
26 June Settlement of the purchase without the caveat being removed.
28 June (about) Lodgment of the instrument of transfer (Transfer) for registration.
29 June Registrar notifies caveator that pursuant to s. 90(1) the caveat would lapse on 31 July unless the caveator obtained an order pursuant to s. 90(2). No order was obtained.
2 August Caveator commences a proceeding against registered proprietor inter alia claiming declarations of a proprietary interest in the land and for other relief in substance supporting the existence of the caveat and preventing registration of the Transfer. An
agreement with the registered proprietor proprietor in early 2016 is alleged whereby the caveator agreed to lend $86,000 on security of this land, followed by that loan. The second defendant was the conveyancer acting for both sides and the third defendant was the purchaser.
3 August The Registrar accordingly issues a Notice of Action prohibiting registration of further dealings until withdrawal of that notice or further order.
16 August Purchaser files Originating Motion seeking order for registration and Summons for dismissal of the caveator’s proceeding.
Digby J ordered the Registrar to register the Transfer and remove the Notice of Action. His Honour reasoned –
- The counting of days under s. 90(1) commenced from 30 June, being the day after the notice, thirty days elapsed on Sunday 30 July, and so the expiry date was 31 July. Accordingly the caveator was out of time. It was irrelevant that s. 105(1) might have achieved a similar result in suspending the progress of registration. -
- The judicial approach to caveat removal applications was analogous to that in applications for injunction, ie the burden of proving the caveatable proprietary interest and maintaining the caveat was upon the caveator who must also establish on the balance of convenience that the caveat should be maintained until the trial of the contested proprietary interest. However, because the caveat had lapsed this case was not the usual caveat removal contest. -
- In any event the caveator had not raised a sufficient prima facie case of or arguable triable issue concerning the asserted proprietary interest. Further, the balance of convenience heavily favoured the purchaser because: the asserted triable issue was palpably weak; and the purchaser would be prejudiced by deferral of registration, particularly having entered a building contract to improve the property which could not be financed until the financier could register a mortgage. , -
- Indemnity costs were awarded against the caveator, particularly because of her very weak case, the purchaser having previously asked the caveator in writing to identify an arguable caveatable interest, without proper response, and given appropriate warning to the caveator.  –