Category: Caveat – Test for maintenance on s. 90(3) application

Blog 74. Leave to appeal against Blog 65 refused

Dolan v Dolan [2023] VSCA 136, Court of Appeal.

In this case the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal from the decision of Ierodiaconou AsJ ([2022] VSC 543) the subject of Blog 65.   The Court of Appeal decision is particularly helpful because the court summarises a number of basic caveat litigation points arising under the TLA s. 90(3), namely:

  1. An application under s. 90(3) is interlocutory in nature, requiring application of the two-stage test of serious question to be tried and balance of convenience, not ordinarily requiring final determination of disputed factual issues or claims, and not giving rise to an issue estoppel or res judicata (although an application under s. 90(3) may amount to an abuse of process).
  2. Where an arguable case is established the caveator is generally required to commence a proceeding with a Writ and pleadings.
  3. As to admissibility of evidence.
  4. That an order removing a caveat to permit sale, with part of the sale proceeds being held on trust pending final determination of the dispute, may be appropriate where the caveator was not in possession or where the claimed interest conferred no possessory right, but may be inappropriate where the claimed interest, of which there was a serious question to be tried, conferred possessory rights or represented the whole or a substantial proportion of the beneficial proprietary interest.

It is helpful first to set out the original decision, commencing with the facts particularly relevant to the appeal –

  • In about 1998 the first defendant (Christine) and other persons purchased land at Lorne (the parent title) for $105,000 with Christine being registered as to a half interest.   They agreed to subdivide it into two blocks, with her taking one.  She deposed that she contributed $52,500 towards the purchase.  The plaintiff (Shannan), who was Christine’s daughter, deposed that she (Shannan) contributed $20,000 towards the purchase.
  • Due to her age and income Christine could not obtain a loan to fund construction of a house.   However, a Bendigo Bank employee advised that if she transferred her interest in the parent title to Shannan an acceptable loan could be secured in Shannan’s name.  Christine deposed that Shannan accepted her proposal to make this transfer so that Shannan could obtain a loan on Christine’s behalf, but that both before and after subdivision she (Christine) would continue as beneficial owner, and that Shannan also accepted other proposed terms relating to the transfer.  Shannan denied accepting this proposal.
  • In 2001 Christine transferred her moiety in the parent title to Shannan, the consideration stated in the Transfer being as “An Agreement to Transfer”.   Following subdivision, one block (the property) was transferred to Shannan, the consideration in that Transfer being stated as “In pursuance of an Agreement between the Transferors for partition of the said land …”, and Shannan in 2003 became registered proprietor of this block.  The bank established a loan account in Shannan’s name with an overdraft limit of $140,000 secured by a mortgage.
  • Christine deposed that the costs for acquisition of the parent title and construction and fit‑out of the house were funded primarily from her personal resources and from the loan account, Shannan only contributing about 7% of overall build costs.   Christine also deposed to making mortgage repayments and that she paid all outgoings including council rates, home insurance, and for maintenance and improvement.  Shannan deposed that the overall build costs were largely drawn down from the loan account, that from 2004 to 2006 she made loan payments, and that Christine did not use her personal resources to fund overall build costs.
  • Upon completion of the house in 2003/2004 Christine, Shannan, and another family member took up residence.  Shannan left in 2006.  In 2021 Christine caveated on the ground of ‘implied, resulting or constructive trust’.  Shannan applied under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) for removal of the caveat.

Ierodiaconou AsJ dismissed the application, holding –

  1. There was a serious question to be tried that Christine was the beneficiary of a common intention constructive trust (she alleged as to 93% of the equitable title). This was supported by: her deposing to the required common intention or agreement; reference to an agreement in the Transfer (her Honour appears to state in the Transfer to Shannan of the subdivided block, but quaere this is a slip for the Transfer to Shannan from Christine); and Christine’s contribution to loan repayments.  Moreover, it appeared to be common ground that Christine contributed most of the purchase price of the parent title and that for many years she made payments into the mortgage loan account and resided on the property.
  2. There was a serious question to be tried that Christine was the beneficiary of a resulting trust (she alleged as to 65% of the equitable title) arising from her contributions to the purchase price of the parent title and to construction and fit-out.
  3. The balance of convenience favoured maintenance of the caveat because of: Christine’s long residence; her age being elderly; evidence of her investing her life savings into the property; the fact that Shannan proposed to sell the property with vacant possession with only $20,000 from the net proceeds being distributed to Christine pending resolution of the dispute; Christine’s claim of a substantial interest in the property; and Christine’s inability to buy another property or rent one in Lorne.  Any hardship for Shannan could be met by Christine’s undertaking to maintain mortgage and property expense payments, which would maintain the status quo of many years, and Christine being required within 7 days to commence a proceeding to establish her interest in the property.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, holding –

  1. The decision at first instance was discretionary and to impugn it the applicant must establish an error of a kind explained in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. [83]
  2. The proposed ground of appeal that the Associate Judge had conducted a “trial” of the Originating Motion (without the applicant being aware of it) and had not just heard the Summons, whereby the final orders created an issue estoppel or res judicata that Christine had a caveatable interest, was misguided and a distraction. The true issue was that the nature of the order made, ie to refuse to order removal of the caveat, reflected in the conclusion in the order dismissing the summons, was interlocutory in nature, in the sense that it did not finally determine any rights in the property.  It was interlocutory because the relief sought was under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) requiring the caveator to establish a serious question to be tried of an estate or interest in the land and that the balance of convenience favoured the maintenance of the caveat until trial.   An application for removal of a caveat did not ordinarily present an occasion for the final determination of disputed factual issues or claims.  Not only was it usual for an application under s. 90(3) to be by Summons or Originating Motion, and for it to be determined by the two-stage test, but where an arguable case was established the caveator was generally required to commence a proceeding to have the claim to an interest in the land determined in a properly constituted suit with a Writ and pleadings.  An Originating Motion was ill-suited to such a dispute and there may be no utility in keeping it on foot. [47]-[55]
  3. The Associate Judge had applied these principles. She had not determined whether the applicant had any equitable interest in the property, but done no more than dismiss the Summons.  No issue estoppel or res judicata [56], [57], [60], [61]
  4. However, in the absence of a relevant change in circumstances, an application to remove the caveat may be an abuse of process. [62]
  5. The submission that the Associate Judge was not entitled to rely on matters stated in a draft Statement of Claim exhibited to and repeated in a paragraph of an affidavit, and in particular the pleading of an agreement between Christine and Shannan, was rejected. The fact that a paragraph in an affidavit was in the same form as a pleading was inconsequential.  Admissibility of the paragraph was determined by reference to the Evidence Act 2008.  Although the form of the paragraph was open to the criticism that it was conclusionary it was admissible because the evidence was relevant and on its face came from the deponent’s personal knowledge.  The evidence was capable of reasonably bearing upon whether there was a triable issue of an agreement or understanding reflecting a common intention as to the beneficial ownership of the property.  The other evidence of an agreement included the change in title, the payment by Christine of part of the purchase price of the parent title and construction costs, and the fact that she continued to occupy the property without paying rent.  In any event, counsel had conceded before the Associate Judge that he was ‘not going to argue that there isn’t a prima facie case here in relation to the caveat’. [65], [71]-[75]
  6. The proposed ground of appeal that the Associate Justice should have determined that at best Christine was entitled to a lesser equitable remedy, ie an order requiring Shannan to hold some of the sale proceeds on trust pending final determination of the dispute, was not established. The Associate Justice was correct in concluding that Christine had raised a serious question to be tried that she held a beneficial interest in the property.  As to the balance of convenience, the caveat itself did not confer any rights on Christine to occupy the property for the purpose of the caveat nor (although likely to affect the ability to sell and price) prevent sale. [42], [84]-[89]
  7. In considering whether the balance of convenience favoured the retention of the caveat, it was necessary to consider the nature of the claimed interest and what the caveat was designed to protect. In cases where the caveator was not in possession or where the claimed interest conferred no possessory right, the claimed proprietary interest may be adequately protected by removing the caveat, allowing the property to be sold and, by orders or undertakings, for the proceeds or part of them to be secured until the respective interests in the property can be determined.  Conversely, where the claimed interest conferred possessory rights or represents the whole or a substantial proportion of the beneficial proprietary interest, it may be appropriate to maintain the caveat and so not alter the registered title pending trial.   In this context two points required examination –
    1. Did the interest claimed by Christine give her a possessory right to the property? On her primary case, she claimed to own 93% of the beneficial interest based on a common intention constructive trust. She had also been in possession since the construction of the house.  In those circumstances it was arguable that the equitable interest would follow the legal interest and give her a right to possession. Alternatively, establishment of her right to equitable relief may arguably also found an order restraining Shannan from evicting her.
    2. In her draft pleading and in her submissions at first instance Christine accepted that the property should be sold but only after determination of the respective equitable interests. Shannan’s submission that, in circumstances where both parties sought sale and distribution of proceeds, it was (necessarily) wrong for the caveat to remain was invalid.  It was open to the Associate Judge to conclude that the caveat should not be removed before the determination of equitable interests because the practical effect this would be a sale and transfer of title with the real risk of an order for possession against Christine.  Christine’s ability to secure alternative accommodation was heavily dependent on her knowing the extent of, and being able to realise, any interest she may have in the property, accordingly the status quo plainly favoured retention of the caveat.  And if Christine was successful on her primary claim and Shannan has no more than a 7% beneficial interest Shannan’s interest may possibly be satisfied without sale.  [90]-[93], [96]-[99]
  2. The Associate Judge was alive to possible prejudice to Shannan from maintenance of the caveat including exposure to mortgage repayments. She correctly decided that the undertakings proffered by Christine to pay certain amounts were adequate to meet any prejudice.  An application to lead fresh evidence to the effect that the mortgage had been in arrears was refused. [100], [102], [103]

Philip H. Barton

Owen Dixon Chambers West

Tuesday, July 25, 2023

 

Blog 62. Caveators lost in blizzard, but obtain injunction.

Reindel & Ors v Confreight Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2022] VSC 442, Daly AsJ (8 August 2022).

This case arises from the same development as that the subject of Blog 61.   It concerns imposition of caveats based on Barnes v Addy claims, no caveatable interest being found to exist. In the 1874 English case of Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch. App. 244 at 251 – 252 Lord Selborne LC stated –

“Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and control over the trust property, imposing on him a corresponding responsibility.  That responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if … But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers … unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees”.

Subsequent cases have worked out the scope of these principles, known as the “first and second limbs of Barnes v Addy”, ie knowing receipt of trust property or dishonest assistance in a breach of trust (being an accessorial liability).

The facts were –

  • In around 2015 Messrs Reindel, Murone and Monson decided to carry out a multi – unit residential development in Windsor. A company (WDC) was incorporated to perform the development.  It was trustee of a unit trust in which Confreight Pty Ltd (Confreight) and Supply Chain Logistics (SCL) controlled respectively by Murone and Monson together held 35%, and an entity associated with Reindel held 65%, of the units.  In 2020 the development was completed and WDC was wound up with negligible return to Confreight and SCL.
  • Five residential units in the development valued at approximately $2 m. in total had been transferred by WDC, one to Reindel and four to a company controlled by him (Blizzard Winds).  On 3 February 2021 the liquidator wrote to the unit holders in the trust seeking information including on this transfer.  On 15 February 2021 the liquidator made his statutory report including stating that there were claims totalling over $2 m. by unsecured creditors.
  • In the first half of 2021 Confreight and SCL caveated over the five Windsor units and over a Toorak property of which Reindel’s wife Ms Runhardt had been registered proprietor since 2015. Relevantly the interest in land claimed was as beneficiary of an “implied, resulting or constructive trust”.
  • In July 2021 Reindel and associated parties commenced a proceeding under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) to remove the caveats. The caveators opposed this and, if their opposition failed, applied to restrain the registered proprietors from dealing with the land pending the determination of their proceeding referred to below.
  • In August 2021 Confreight and SCL commenced a proceeding (the investors’ proceeding) alleging inter alia that: Reindel had caused WDC to transfer much cash and the Windsor units to himself and his associated entities for little or no consideration; by reason of his alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and of trust they were inter alia entitled to orders that property of the unit trust be transferred to WDC (in its capacity as trustee), and/or equitable compensation for the value of property transferred from WDC in breach of trust or for less than market value, and certain other relief.
  • The defendants to the investors’ proceeding in substance denied the allegations against them, alleging that transfers were in reduction of debts duly owing.
  • The plaintiffs in the investors’ proceeding also alleged that Reindel had used WDC’s funds for mortgage payments on and renovations to the Toorak property. Reindel admitted these payments into his and Runhardt’s joint account, and that payments were applied to paying the mortgage, but denied misappropriation.  The plaintiffs also alleged that Runhardt participated in Reindel’s breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust by receiving trust property with knowledge of his breaches.  Runhardt basically denied all allegations concerning her.
  • On 14 September 2021 WDC’s liquidator applied to intervene in the caveat proceeding, supported by an affidavit exhibiting his letter of 3 February and his report. He subsequently did not pursue this application.
  • The caveat and injunction proceedings were heard in October 2021 with judgment reserved. Although no orders were made in the caveat or the investors’ proceeding that the evidence in one proceeding would stand as evidence in the other Daly AsJ would (footnote [92]) if necessary have ordered this now as for then (traditionally “nunc pro tunc”). Her Honour stated ([25]) that the findings and issues raised by the liquidator’s report and letter and WDC’s accounting records were a generally reliable guide to the affairs of WDC and the unit trust, although it was unnecessary for present purposes to determine whether the concerns raised therein had been established.  Her Honour noted ([64]) that the liquidator’s affidavit, his letter, his report and the accounting records revealed evidence of the transfers of Windsor units being for no consideration or at an undervalue, although it was premature to conclusively determine whether in breach of trust or otherwise invalid (also [34]).
  • In January 2022 the liquidator sought, inter alia, court approval to enter an agreement to assign certain unspecified causes of action to a Mr Baker – it was unclear but her Honour inferred that there was a substantial overlap between these causes of action and those in the investors’ proceeding ([31]). The liquidator also applied to be appointed as a receiver of the unit trust, deposing that he believed that this was necessitated by cl. 12.5 of the trust deed which provided that on its liquidation WDC ceased to be trustee of the trust.
  • Clause 37 of the trust deed provided:

“the rights of the trustee to indemnity for losses … and to recoupment for expenditure incurred shall … be limited to the monies and property comprising the Trust Fund … but this clause shall not be construed as in any way limiting the liability of any trustee (or of any director of a company which is a trustee hereof) to the unit holders for any breach of trust involving the dishonesty or wilful act or omission of that trustee or director.”

Daly AsJ removed the caveats but granted an interlocutory injunction restraining Reindel and Blizzard Winds from dealing with their residential units –

  1. The possibility of the caveators having a prima facie case of an interest in the land was undermined if they lacked standing to bring their claims in the investors’ proceeding, or this was in doubt. Generally the proper party to bring a claim to recover trust property was the trustee but this was subject to “special circumstances”, eg collusion between the third party wrongdoer and the trustee, insolvency of the trustee, or where the trustee was unwilling or unable to take action to recover trust property. There were real doubts whether the caveators had standing to, in effect, recover WDC’s property.  Alternatively, any claim for damages and/or equitable compensation would have to be calculated by reference to their shares in the unit trust.  [40]-[41], [46], [47]
  2. Confreight and SCL could also in their capacity as shareholders of WDC apply under s. 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to bring a derivative action to bring the claims in the investors’ proceeding on behalf of WDC. This application had not been made, although they had made an informal application for leave to continue the investors’ proceeding standing in the shoes of WDC in its capacity as trustee. [48]
  3. On the issue of standing, the position was somewhat fluid and far from clear cut. There was some doubt whether on its liquidation WDC remained as trustee of the unit trust or whether the liquidator was ready, willing, and able to pursue any claim by WDC against third parties for the benefit of the beneficiaries (and creditors) of the trust, but it appeared that liquidator had not reached a final position.  Clause 37 of the trust deed preserved the beneficiaries’ entitlement to pursue claims against the trustee and the directors, at least on their own behalf. And although the plaintiffs arguably needed curial leave to proceed with their claims in the investors’ proceeding to recover trust property, it was in the context of the current case neither necessary nor appropriate to determine the possible fate of this application for leave.  It was accordingly difficult for present purposes finally to resolve the question of standing and this undermined the caveats, given that the entitlement to lodge a caveat must exist at the time of lodgement. [55], [56], [57], [62], [63]
  4. The caveators must demonstrate a prima facie case, ie a probability of being found to have the asserted legal or equitable rights or interest in the land. The ‘prima facie case’ test was preferable to the ‘serious question to be tried’ test of such rights or interest. [69]-[70]
  5. The caveats over the Toorak property were unsustainable. Runhardt was alleged at most to have accessorial liability for Reindel’s (and WDC’s) alleged breach of trust.  In Barnes v Addy cases a constructive trust was only imposed over the property concerned on a curial determination to this effect.  Until then there was no proprietary interest, even where it was claimed that trust property could be “traced” to a particular (other) property.  Further, any “notice” Runhardt had of Reindel’s alleged breach of trust postdated her becoming registered proprietor of the Toorak property. [80]-[82], [91(c)], [138]
  6. Even if breach of trust or of fiduciary duty was established against Reindel or WDC, the liability of Blizzard Winds was (notwithstanding that Reindel was its sole director) only accessorial. Further, even if the transfers to Blizzard Winds were arguably tainted by fraud which could be sheeted home to it so it lost the protection of indefeasibility of title, and a court ultimately determined to impose a constructive trust over the units, the entitlement of a former registered proprietor to set aside a transfer for fraud was an in personam claim giving rise to a mere equity, not an equitable and so caveatable interest.  Accordingly the caveats over its property would also be removed. [83]-[87], [91], [94], [96], [138]
  7. The claim concerning the transfer to Reindel was also only an in personam claim incapable of supporting a caveat. [87], [91(a)], [94], [96], [138]
  8. However, Reindel and Blizzard Winds would be restrained from dealing with the units transferred to them. Runhardt would not be restrained from dealing with the Toorak property. [117]-[121], [133], [137], [138]

       Philip H. Barton

          Owen Dixon Chambers West

        Monday, November 7, 2022

Blog 61. Caveator narrowly escapes blizzard.

Reindel & Ors v Confreight Pty Ltd & Ors (No 1) [2022] VSC 163, Daly AsJ (4 April 2022).

This case is interesting for several reasons.  First, Daly AsJ discusses the subtle difference between the competing tests of ‘prima facie case’ or ‘serious question to be tried’ for a caveator to hold a sufficient interest in land in proceedings under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3).  Her Honour comes down on the side of the former.  (However it is difficult to think of any case in which a court held that a caveator satisfied one and not the other test).    Second, her Honour conducts a long survey of the authorities on creation of equitable charges.  Third, her Honour summarises principles of contractual interpretation.  The facts were –

  • A company developed land including for 69 residential units.  Reindel and a company of which he was director (Blizzard Winds) were the registered proprietors of one and four units respectively.  Another company (ABPC) was controlled by Baker.
  • Reindel and Baker had a long, complicated and contentious financial association culminating in a written agreement alleged by Baker and denied by Reindel to have been made between ABPC and Reindel on 11 September 2020 (2020 facility agreement).  Although Reindel’s electronic signature appeared on this document he denied signing it, alleging that Baker had affixed it without his authority.  The agreement recited that the Lender (ABPC) had agreed to provide the Borrower (Reindel) with a “secured term loan facility” of $498,956.  It defined: “Finance Document” as “this agreement, the Security Document and any other document designated as such by the Lender and the Borrower”; “Security” as “any mortgage, charge (whether fixed or floating, legal or equitable) … or other security interest securing any obligation of any person or any other agreement or arrangement having a similar effect”; and “Security Document” as ”the right to take an assignment or a legal charge in the agreed form, executed or to be executed by the Borrower or by (sic)”.  It included –

“8.1 The Borrower confirms the Security outlined in schedule A (or once entered into, will create): (a) valid, legally binding and enforceable Security for the obligations expressed to be secured by it; and (b) subject to registration, perfected Security over the assets expressed to be subject to security in it.

8.2 The security will be held by the appointed representative in favour of the Lender, until the loan has been repaid in full

8.3 It is agreed the Lender has the priority and ranking expressed to be created in the Security Document and ranking ahead of all (if any) Security and rights of third parties except those preferred by law”

Schedule A provided under the heading “Security”:

“The apartments listed below are registered in the name of the Borrower and/or Blizzard Winds Pty Ltd … It is therefore agreed that in the event of default, the Lender can immediately register a secured charge against each or any of the following apartments.  To the maximum value of the capitalized loan amount plus accrued interest Lot 203, 204, and 205 James Street Windsor 3181 Lot 502 and G12 White Stret (sic) Windsor 3181”

  • Baker alleged that Reindel owed $563,966.77 under this agreement. A proceeding was on foot in which each claimed that the other person, or a company controlled by the other person, owed the claimant money.  Reindel admitted receiving $498,956 from ABPC, but said that this was in reduction of a previous debt owed by Baker.
  • ABPC had not registered any charge. It caveated over the above five units as chargee under the 2020 facility agreement.  Reindel applied under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) to remove those caveats.

Daly AsJ upheld the caveat over Reindel’s unit and removed the caveats over those of Blizzard Winds –

  1. The caveator must demonstrate a prima facie case, ie a probability of being found to have the asserted legal or equitable rights or interest in the land. There must be a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the maintenance of the caveat and the preservation of the status quo pending trial.  The ‘prima facie case’ test was preferable to the ‘serious question to be tried’ test.  The difference between the tests was one of degree, yet material, recognising the potentially adverse consequences to a registered proprietor of constraint from dealing with the property in circumstances where a caveator was generally not required to provide an undertaking for damages. [20]-[22]
  2. The question whether Reindel signed or authorised the signing of the agreement and the characterisation of the payments to him were matters for trial. [24], [75]
  3. The 2020 facility agreement was to be construed: with reference to what a reasonable business person with knowledge of the context and purpose of the transaction would have understood those terms to mean (Reindel and Baker were experienced businessmen); and avoiding commercial absurdity and commercial inconvenience as far as the language of the agreement allowed. Further, a court would endeavour to enforce rather than destroy a bargain, unless the agreement’s terms were so vague and confusing as to render ascertainment of the parties’ common intention impossible. [46]-[48]
  4. Courts would, consistent with the principles governing the construction of commercial contracts, adopt a liberal approach to the construction of instruments such as the 2020 facility agreement, and would generally strive to give effect to a clause purporting to confer a security interest in property, even if ambiguously or inelegantly expressed. [49]
  5. The 2020 facility agreement evidenced a common intention by Reindel and ABPC that any sums advanced pursuant to it were secured on the units referred to in Schedule A upon default by Reindel, and that upon default ABPC would be entitled to register a “charge” over the units. There was at least a prima facie case of an immediate intention to create an equitable charge because –
    1. The reference in the recitals to the provision of a “secured term loan facility” evidenced the purpose of the transaction and guided its construction.
    2. “Security” was defined expansively and consistently with what someone engaged in property development would understand a security to be.
    3. The definition of “Security Document” referred to an instrument to give effect to the agreement between the parties, rather than of itself creating a proprietary interest.
    4. Although the language of cl. 8.1 was clumsy, there was a prima facie case that, when read with Schedule A, the parties intended the “Security” referred to in Schedule A to be the borrower’s then unencumbered interest in the units enumerated in Schedule A. The reference to a “secured charge” being registrable upon default was merely a machinery provision in aid of enforcement in the event of default, and not an agreement to provide future security requiring further consideration.
    5. The creation of any charge over the units was not dependent on execution of a further document capable of registration. Because Part IV of the Transfer of Land Act only provided for registration of a charge securing payment of an annuity nothing further (notwithstanding what the agreement appeared to contemplate) could be done to register the charge.
    6. The entitlement to an equitable charge arose on default, not at the time of entry into the agreement. The relevant clause was “apt to create an equitable charge”.
    7. The units were sufficiently identified without reference to particulars of title.
    8. The definitions of “Security Document” and “Finance Document” did not detract from the conclusion that the agreement conferred an immediate equitable interest in the units on ABPC, because: the definition of “Security Document” was incomplete and unintelligible in attempting to equate a document with a proprietary interest; the term “Security Document” was not referred to in Schedule A; while the term “Security Document” was referred to in cl. 8.3, that clause was not concerned with the existence or creation of ABPC’s security interest but with its priority; and the term “Finance Document” was not referred to in cl. 8.1 or Schedule A, but only in other not presently relevant clauses. [59]-[63], [67], [68], [71]-[73]
  6. Accordingly the caveator had a caveatable interest in Reindel’s unit. However, notwithstanding that Blizzard Winds’ units were enumerated in Schedule A, even if Reindel entered the agreement he did not do so on behalf of Blizzard Winds. Accordingly the caveator had no caveatable interest in its units. [26], [59], [74], [75]
  7. The balance of convenience favoured maintenance of the caveat over Reindel’s unit. On the one hand there was evidence of an executed agreement and of funds advanced without repayment, a counterclaim advancing ABPC’s claims was well underway, and the caveat assisted ABPC in giving notice of its claim to other claimants.  On the other hand there was no evidence that Reindel needed to sell or encumber his unit. [75]

Philip H. Barton
Owen Dixon Chambers West
Friday, October 28, 2022

41. Indemnity costs – Injunction against caveating – Mercury Draught Cider drinking caveator attracts both injunction and indemnity costs.

The two cases in this Blog are, but for one point, mundane cases of removal of hopeless caveats, indemnity costs and in the second case an injunction against caveating.  The one point is that in the second case the case for an injunction was so strong that the Associate Justice did not require an undertaking as to damages.  The mundaneness of the cases is also enlivened by some remarks by the caveator in the second case.

In Devine v Bernstone [2020] VSC 507, (17 August 2020), Croucher J, the facts were –
  • The plaintiff and defendant were involved in litigation pending before the County Court relating to monies which the defendant alleged were owed to him by a company of which the plaintiff is or was a director.
  • In 2018 the defendant caveated over a property owned by the plaintiff to protect his alleged interest under the agreements the subject of the County Court proceedings. His solicitors advised him that he had no caveatable interest and the caveat was withdrawn.
  • The plaintiff subsequently entered a contract to sell this property. Settlement was due on 28 November 2019 but was postponed because the defendant caveated again, this time on the ground of an alleged agreement dated 18 November 2019.
  • The plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant seeking details regarding the alleged agreement without response. They also requested that he remove the caveat to which he responded that he would do so in exchange for payment of $240,000.
  • The plaintiff commenced proceedings under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) to remove the caveat. At the hearing in December 2019 the defendant (who was self-represented) said that the reference in the caveat to an agreement dated 18 November 2019 was erroneous, stated that he instead relied on an alleged conversation with the plaintiff and on a term in a loan agreement, but ultimately accepted that the caveat had no proper basis and withdrew his opposition to removal.

His Honour ordered the defendant to pay costs on an indemnity basis because of special circumstances, being –

  1. The ground stated in the caveat did not exist. [31]
  2. The alternative justifications for the caveat raised at the hearing were unmeritorious and the alleged conversation with the plaintiff was unsupported by evidence. [32]-[34]
  3. The caveat was lodged in wilful disregard of repeated advice to the defendant (including from his solicitors) that he had no caveatable interest. [35]
  4. The caveat was lodged with the ulterior motive of exerting pressure on the plaintiff to repay monies allegedly owed. [36]
  5. Because the defendant refused to withdraw the caveat the plaintiff had to commence this proceeding and so incur costs. [37]
  6. The plaintiff’s solicitors warned that indemnity costs would be sought. [38]

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology v Galloway & Anor [2020] VSC 575, (9 September 2020), Derham AsJ.

RMIT owned the Oxford Scholar Hotel.  It entered a contract with Schiavello Construction (Vic) Pty Ltd (Schiavello) to redevelop and refurbish the hotel.  Schiavello engaged the first defendant as a subcontractor for the works.  He claimed that Schiavello owed him money.  RMIT called for expressions of interest, closing on 26 August, for the purchase of other land (“the land”) owned by it.  After this call the first defendant on 18 August lodged a caveat on the title to the land claiming a freehold estate pursuant to an agreement with the registered proprietor dated 3 August 2020.  Various expressions of interest were lodged and RMIT desired to advance the sale.

The first defendant had no legal relationship with RMIT, whose solicitors wrote to him twice seeking withdrawal of the caveat and warning that failing this proceedings would be issued and indemnity costs and compensation for loss suffered by RMIT would be sought.  He replied derisively including inviting the writer to “feel free to drop a slab around sometime”, stating that he drank Mercury Draught Cider, stating “see you in Court honey”, and accusing RMIT of behaving like foolish little children.

He also emailed RMIT: threatening to dump a truckload of rubbish outside the hotel and to put up posters at RMIT making allegations against RMIT; making personal threats against RMIT personnel; and demonstrating that he was aware of the baseless nature of the caveat and that he intended by it to inflict legal cost and media attention on RMIT.

RMIT applied for removal of the caveat under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3).  The first defendant acknowledged that the caveat was a desperate attempt to induce RMIT to intervene in his dispute with Schiavello.  Derham AsJ:

  • stated the criteria for caveat removal under s. 90(3) in conventional terms (eg see Blogs under Category “Caveat – Test for maintenance on s. 90(3) application”); [16]-[18]
  • removed the caveat on the ground of no prima facie interest in the land and (if necessary) balance of convenience; [20]-[22]
  • enjoined the first defendant against further caveating on the title of any land of which RMIT was registered proprietor.  Although an undertaking as to damages was offered by RMIT his Honour stated that the legal right to an injunction was so clear and the balance of convenience so weighted that an undertaking was neither necessary nor appropriate [24]; and
  • as the caveat was lodged for an ulterior motive and being used as a bargaining chip, ordered him to pay indemnity costs. [23], [25]

Philip H. Barton

Owen Dixon Chambers West

29 September 2020

40. B acquires monies from A by mistake or in breach of trust, which B passes on to a third party, who uses them to purchase land of which third party becomes registered proprietor – Monies held on constructive trust for A – Not mere equity – Caveat by A based on constructive trust upheld – AE Brighton Holdings Pty Ltd v UDP Holdings Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 235. No purchaser’s lien and so no caveatable interest because purchaser in breach of contract of sale – Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Grady [2020] VSC 344.

AE Brighton Holdings Pty Ltd v UDP Holdings Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 235 (11 September 2020) was an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal from the case of that name covered in Blog 32, in which Ginnane J dismissed an application under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) for caveats to be removed.  The facts are now restated from that Blog and supplemented –

  • Esposito Holdings Pty Ltd (Esposito Holdings) agreed to sell and the first defendant (UDP) agreed to purchase the issued shares in a company. An arbitration occurred related to disputes arising under that agreement.  The arbitral Award stated that Esposito Holdings had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct contrary to s. 18 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and that its sole shareholder and director Mr Antonio Esposito was involved in the contravention within the meaning of s. 2(1) and for the purposes of s. 236 of Schedule 2.  The Award also declared that on and from 31 January 2014 Esposito Holdings held the purchase price on constructive trust for UDP which had suffered loss of $54,144,847.
  • The plaintiff (AE Brighton) purchased and became registered proprietor of four properties.
  • There was prima facie evidence that, when Mr Esposito was also sole shareholder and director of AE Brighton, part of the purchase price received from UDP under the share sale agreement was paid by Esposito Holdings, possibly through another company controlled by Mr Esposito, to AE Brighton to purchase the properties, possibly in the case of one purchase through repayment of an earlier loan used for that purchase.
  • In 2017 UDP caveated over the properties on the grounds of an implied, resulting or constructive trust.
  • In 2018 the Supreme Court gave UDP leave to enforce the Award and ordered that it be given effect as a judgment of the Court (‘Award recognition judgment’).
  • In 2019 AE Brighton entered contracts to sell two of the properties.

After the decision of Ginnane J in October 2019 UDP took an assignment of a mortgage registered on the properties, took possession, as mortgagee in possession rescinded the contracts of sale, and sold the properties with settlement due on 4 September 2020.  Its solicitor swore that the net proceeds of sale would be paid into court pending resolution of a proceeding.

The Court of Appeal (Kyrou, Kaye and Sifris JJA) held or stated –

  1. The law related to applications under s. 90(3) in conventional terms (eg see Blog 1). [25]-[26]
  2. A successful challenge to the exercise of judicial discretion by Ginnane J required establishment of an error of the kind identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. [27]
  3. Only a legal or equitable interest in land could sustain a caveat and accordingly, as stated by the High Court in Boensch v Pascoe [2019] HCA 49 (Blog 29), a mere statutory right to take steps to avoid a transaction did not suffice – the interest asserted must be in existence when the caveat was lodged. A mere equity, defined in various ways including ‘a right, usually of a procedural character, which is ancillary to some right of property, and which limits it or qualifies it in some way’, was not a proprietary interest. [28]-[29]
  4. The constructive trust of the type upon which UDP relied was an institutional trust arising from the retention of funds known to have been paid by mistake. More particularly –

(a)        This trust arose at the time when the person who received the funds acquired knowledge of the mistake, if the moneys paid could still be identified at that time.  The recipient’s conscience was then bound and it would be against conscience for the recipient to use the funds as his or her own. [30]

(b)      “Knowledge” meant the payee having actual knowledge, or wilfully shutting his or her eyes to the obvious, or wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make, or having knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest or reasonable person. [31]

  1. A third party may be liable to account as a constructive trustee where it received trust property with notice that it was being dealt with in a manner involving a breach of trust. In accordance with the equitable principle of tracing, the beneficial owner of misappropriated property could recover it or its traceable proceeds from someone holding the asset, subject only to the defence of bona fide purchaser for value without notice.  Where a trustee wrongfully used trust money to provide part of the cost of acquiring an asset, the beneficiary was entitled at his or her option either to claim a proportionate share of the asset or to enforce a lien upon it to secure his or her personal claim against the trustee for the amount of the misapplied money. [32]-[33]
  2. This case had two features usually absent from cases where a caveator claimed an interest under a constructive trust –

(a)     There was a declaration, recognised by the Award recognition judgment which itself had the effect of declaring as a matter of law, that Esposito Holdings held the purchase price paid by UDP on constructive trust for UDP from 31 January 2014;

(b)    Secondly, the sole director of the corporate registered proprietor of the properties (Mr Esposito) had given sworn evidence at a public examination that funds subject to the constructive trust were used to purchase the properties.  He was aware of all the facts giving rise to the constructive trust.  As he was its sole director his knowledge was attributable to Esposito Holdings.  It was its knowledge of those facts, which operated on its conscience, that could give rise to an institutional constructive trust without the need for a court order and which enabled the arbitrator to declare the existence of a constructive trust from 31 January 2014.  Importantly, as Mr Esposito was also the sole director of the plaintiff, his knowledge was attributable to the plaintiff.

The combination of those two features established a prima facie case that the beneficiary of the constructive trust had an equitable interest in the properties, in accordance with the principles of tracing. [55], [56], [58].

  1. The Evidence Act 2008 s. 91 provided that evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding was inadmissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. However, s. 91 did not preclude Ginnane J from relying on the Final Award and the evidence adduced in the arbitration, as they were not being used to prove the existence of any fact but were being considered in assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to enable UDP to establish a prima facie case of the existence of a caveatable interest. [45], [59]-[60]

In Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Grady [2020] VSC 344 (11 June 2020), Ginnane J, the facts and relevant holdings were –

  • In 2006 the plaintiff entered a contract of sale to purchase land from vendors of which the defendant was the survivor.  The settlement date was no later than 7 years but was extended.
  • A deposit and certain instalments of purchase money were paid, but the final instalment was not.  Part of the land was transferred.  The vendor rescinded the contract.
  • The purchaser caveated on the basis of an alleged equitable (purchaser’s) lien over the untransferred land to secure repayment of instalments of purchase money and interest.
  • The purchaser succeeded in a claim for restitution.  However the purchaser was held not to have a caveatable interest.  His Honour observed that where title was not conveyed the purchaser’s lien secured the repayment of monies paid by the purchaser, to whom it gave a right to sell the property and take a share of the proceeds of sale in an amount equal to the debt.  But there must be a debt which the lien could secure.  Here there was no lien because the purchaser was in default of its obligations under the contract: the purchaser was only entitled to the lien where the contract went off through no fault of its own. [307], [309], [310], [312]-[314]

Philip H. Barton

Owen Dixon Chambers West

21 September 2020

 

37. Caveat claiming resulting implied or constructive trust removed – No prima facie case – Difference between “prima facie case” and “serious question to be tried” tests – Circumstances in which hearsay admissible on application under TLA s. 90(3).

SMAV Nominees Pty Ltd v Bakal Enterprises Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 203 (24 April 2020), Derham AsJ

Comment.   This case is interesting for the following reasons –

1.   It considers the circumstances in which hearsay is admissible on an application to remove a caveat under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3).  See also Blog 11.

2.     Derham AsJ considers whether the caveator has to show, as to the existence of its asserted legal or equitable rights in the land, on the one hand a prima facie case or on the other hand a serious question to be tried.  His Honour states that the first is the correct test (as previously stated in Blog 1) and indeed states (at [64]) that the first test requires a higher standard than the second, citing the decision of Warren CJ in Piroshenko v Grojsman [2010] VSC 240; (2010) 27 VR 489.  It is, however, difficult to find any case in which a court holds that a caveator met one and not the other test (in this case Derham AsJ finds that caveator failed both), and indeed in Concrete Mining Structures Pty Ltd v Cellcrete Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 888 at [33] (not a caveat case) Edelman J stated that the difference between the two tests is one of language not of substance.

3.   Although his Honour simply ordered that the caveator pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application he reserved liberty to apply in relation to his proposed orders.  It was ominous that he also found that the caveat had been used as a bargaining chip as this may foreshadow indemnity costs – see Blog 35 and previous Blogs on costs. 

The facts were –

·      In October and November 2017 the plaintiff’s sole director Mavroudis loaned Sabawi a total of $200,000.

·     In April 2018 Mavroudis was introduced to 294 Pound Road Hampton Park (“the property”) by Sabawi, whom he believed to be a licensed real estate agent.   On 13 April he signed a “Letter of Offer Expression of Interest” and paid a holding deposit of $10,000 to one of the vendors at the direction of Sabawi.

·    On or about 17 April 2018 Sabawi asked Mavroudis for his bank account details so that he could repay the loan of $200,000.  Mavroudis did this.  Sabawi subsequently advised Mavroudis that he had repaid the $200,000 to his account.  Mavroudis received the $200,000 into his account on 18 April 2018, recorded in his bank statement as “Inward Telegraphic Transfer 180490”.   

·   On 7 July 2018 Sabawi presented the contract of sale to Mavroudis for signing with the purchaser named as “294 Pound Road Pty Ltd” and the vendor’s estate agent named as a particular company formed by the two of them other than for the purpose of selling real estate.  Mavroudis signed only after insisting that the document be altered to show the plaintiff as purchaser and the sale as being by private treaty.   The plaintiff became registered proprietor. 

·  On 23 August 2019, the solicitors for the plaintiff and Mavroudis received a letter of demand from the then solicitors for the first defendant (“Bakal Enterprises”) demanding repayment of $200,000.  Among other things the letter alleged that, following discussion with an unnamed mutual friend, Bakal Enterprises had paid $200,000 into Mavroudis’s account on 18 April 2018 as a contribution towards a development on the property, which had fallen over.  Shortly before this letter Mavroudis received a telephone call to similar effect from, he gathered, Bakal, who was Bakal Enterprises’ sole director.

·        On 27 August 2019 the plaintiff’s solicitors responded, stating that Mavroudis’ first knowledge of these allegations was in this telephone call and refuting them.  On 16 September 2019 the then solicitors for Bakal Enterprises responded confirming that the mutual friend was Sabawi, enclosing a receipt so as to corroborate the statement that Bakal Enterprises and not Sabawi had made the $200,000 payment, and demanding its repayment. 

·     The plaintiff heard nothing further until receiving notice that Bakal Enterprises through its new solicitors Madgwicks had caveated on 10 February 2020 claiming a freehold interest in the property on the basis of a resulting implied or constructive trust.

·     The plaintiff’s solicitors demanded removal of the caveat and stated  that the $200,000 had been repayment of a loan by Sabawi.  On 27 and 28 February Madgwicks and the plaintiff’s solicitors communicated, in the course of which:

·       Madgwicks stated that Sabawi denied the loan, maintaining that the caveator had an interest in the land arising from the contribution of $200,000 towards its purchase;

·   the plaintiff’s solicitors provided documentary evidence of the $200,000 loan to Sabawi, foreshadowed caveat removal proceedings, reiterated Mavroudis’ previous account of the facts, and stated that: the plaintiff had purchased the property with its own funds and financial assistance from Mavroudis’s father; a planning permit for a subdivision of the property was imminent; the plaintiff had a very interested buyer once it could sell with plans and permits but that this was impeded by the caveat. 

·        On or about 5 March Bakal and Sabawi conferred with Madgwicks. On 12 March Madgwicks wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors stating, after reiterating its instructions about the $200,000 payment, that Sabawi had instructed it that Mavroudis inappropriately altered the name of the purchaser in the contract of sale from 294 Pound Road Pty Ltd (to be incorporated between Mavroudis and Sabawi) to the plaintiff’s name and “[we] are informed by Mr Sabawi that this change was made under false pretences and without adequate payment to Mr Sabawi, who was instrumental in facilitating the sale in the first place …. Mr Sabawi is currently attending to swearing a statutory declaration confirming the above…”.

The plaintiff applied under s. 90(3) of the Transfer of Land Act for removal of the caveat.  Before the caveator filed any evidence Madgwicks offered in return for withdrawal of the caveat that $300,000 be held in trust pending determination of the dispute.

The material before the court included –

·      an affidavit by the caveator’s solicitor which stated that a statutory declaration was being prepared by Sabawi;

·       an affidavit by Bakal.  This affidavit exhibited a statutory declaration, inferred by his Honour to have been prepared by Madgwicks, said to have been made by Sabawi, containing Sabawi’s evidence including disputing Mavroudis’ account of the facts.   Bakal asserted that Sabawi had not sworn an affidavit because of the social distancing measures required in the COVID-19 pandemic. The statutory declaration omitted reference to the false pretences allegation contained in Madgwicks’ letter of 12 March.  It included that: in March 2018 Sabawi told Mavroudis that he was getting a friend to pay the deposit for the purchase; that after the $200,000 payment, Mavroudis acknowledged to Sabawi that the plaintiff had received the money; and he informed Mavroudis at the time of payment that the money was sent to him from Bakal for the purposes of the purchase.

·        Bakal’s affidavit contained a rendition of financial and property dealings between Sabawi and Bakal, with repetition of statements allegedly made by Sabawi about Mavroudis.  Bakal deposed –

·        that he did not know Mavroudis personally and other than the transfer of the $200,000 he had not had any relationship or dealings with him or his entities;

·        (partly denied by Mavroudis) as to an alleged involvement in this transfer of $200,000, garnished with further complex dealings.  He deposed that: on or about 18 April 2018, he transferred $200,000 to the plaintiff by electronic fund transfer, without contact between the plaintiff (or Mavroudis) and Bakal Enterprises (or Bakal); the details of who and when to pay were provided by Sabawi to him.  The reference on the payment produced by Bakal was “Deposit Pound Road”.  

·        affidavits by Mavroudis in which he deposed that when he signed the contract of sale he did not know, or know of, the caveator or anyone associated with it, and that he had not entered into any agreement, either personally or through any agent, with the caveator or any other party in relation to the property.  Mavroudis deposed that there was no truth in the account in the statutory declaration. 

The plaintiff submitted that the statutory declaration was inefficacious for non- compliance with the Oaths and Affirmations Act 2018 in its execution and witnessing. 

Derham AsJ held –

1.     Sabawi could have sworn an affidavit deposing to the matters in his statutory declaration.   The inconsistencies between the statutory declaration and matters raised in correspondence, in particular in the Madgwicks letter of 12 March, were relevant to an assessment of the strength of the caveator’s claim.  [27]-[28]

2.     However, regardless of the efficacy of that statutory declaration under the Oaths and Affirmations Act, the material in it was admissible because –

(a)     Under r. 43.03(2) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, on an interlocutory application an affidavit may contain a statement of fact based on information and belief if the grounds were set out.  This included the identification of the supplier of the information, ie its source.  Nonetheless, the Court had a discretion to admit an affidavit non-compliant in this regard;

(b)     Section 75 of the Evidence Act 2008 provided that in an interlocutory proceeding the hearsay rule did not apply to evidence if the party who adduced it also adduced evidence of its source.  The source must be identified by name;

(c)     If Bakal’s affidavit had related the material in the statutory declaration as what he had been told by Sabawi it would have been admissible, this application being interlocutory and the source being disclosed. [51]-[56]

3.     His Honour set out the law on caveats in conventional terms, which, as this law is set out in Blog 1, it is unnecessary to repeat except in one regard.   His Honour noted that: the caveator bore the onus of establishing a prima facie case to be tried, ie a probability on the evidence that the caveator will be found to have the asserted legal or equitable rights or interest in the land, not that it was more probable than not that at trial it (his Honour states “the plaintiff” but this appears to be a slip) would succeed; and that probability is sufficient to justify the practical effect which the caveat has on the ability of the registered proprietor to deal with the property in accordance with their normal proprietary rights;

this test was often used interchangeably with whether the caveator established a serious question to be tried, but the prima facie case test was to be preferred;

the “prima facie case” test required a higher standard that the “serious question to be tried” test.  [30]-[33], [64]

4.     Where two people provided the purchase money for a property jointly, but the property was put into the name of one of them only, the property was, in the absence of a relationship giving rise to a presumption of advancement, presumed to be held on resulting trust in favour of the unregistered party in proportion to their contribution. [57]

5.     The caveator had not established a prima facie case or even, if it had been applicable, satisfied the serious question to be tried test, because Mavroudis gave evidence that he believed the payment of $200,000 was repayment of a debt and the evidence to the contrary was at best contained in Sabawi’s statutory declaration, which was of little weight, ambiguous and contrived.   Insofar as it purported to ascribe knowledge to Mavroudis of the purpose of the payment, it did not support a resulting trust claim: there was no identification of the supposed beneficiary of the trust beyond “a friend” and the ambiguous statement that the money was sent to the plaintiff by Bakal for the purpose of purchasing the property.  That might indicate that the beneficiary was to be Sabawi or Bakal.   The only objective evidence supporting the caveator’s claim was the payment of $200,000 itself and the record that Bakal produced that it related to “Pound Road”.   However, there was no evidentiary link between the payment of $200,000 and the payment of the deposit nearly three months later. [58]-[65], [76]

6.     For the same reasons there was also no prima facie case of a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust.  There was no evidence of consensus between the caveator and the registered proprietor which could give rise to a joint endeavour. [66]-[69]

7.    There was no suggestion that the existence of a claim for restitution gave rise to any equitable interest in the property. [70], [76]

8.     The caveat had been used as a bargaining chip to obtain payment of $200,000.  Although there were many cases in which a caveat dispute was resolved as proposed by the caveator’s solicitors, with the addition of a mechanism for the resolution of the dispute sometimes involving the caveator commencing a proceeding, the registered proprietor was entitled to deal with its property as it saw fit without being restrained by the injunctive effect of the caveat unless the caveator established a proper basis for the caveat. [73]-[76]

9.     The caveator was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application.  His Honour however reserved liberty to apply in relation to his proposed orders. [77]

Philip H. Barton

Owen Dixon Chambers West

26 May 2020

 

30. Vendors agreeing to extend settlement date through act of agent with actual or ostensible authority – Not a formal variation of contract of sale required to comply with Instruments Act s. 126 but a waiver or estoppel – However caveator by withdrawing previous caveat had elected not to sue for specific performance but only to claim damages or was estopped from asserting the contrary – Caveat removed.

Chan & Anor v Liu & Anor [2020] VSCA 28 (25 February 2020) was a successful appeal from a decision of Forbes J [2019] VSC 650 upholding a caveat.  The facts were –

  • By a contract dated 21 July 2018 the first respondent Zhenzhu Liu agreed to purchase a property in Burwood Highway, Burwood, from the applicants for $2,450,000 with settlement due on 22 July 2019.
  • Most of the discussions concerning the sale were between Mr Liu’s wife Yumei Feng and Xuehang Cheng who was a sales consultant employed by the selling agents.  Soon after the contract was entered into she asked through him whether the vendors would agree to extend settlement to 15 September 2019 without penalty.  After speaking to the second vendor he conveyed that the vendors would only agree to an extension to 22 August 2019.  Ms Feng again sought an extension to 15 September, Mr Cheng again sought the vendors’ consent and again confirmed that the vendors would extend settlement to 22 August 2019.  Further interaction to similar effect then occurred between the purchaser’s solicitors and the agents, and on 10 August 2018 the agents again stated that the vendors had agreed to extend the settlement date to 22 August 2019.
  • Mr Liu deposed that he and Ms Feng believed that the extension to 22 August 2019 was confirmed and that only the further request to extend settlement to 15 September 2019 was not, and that they were preparing their finances for settlement on 22 August 2019 in reliance on the agent’s representation.
  • On 10 August 2018 Mr Liu caveated claiming an interest in the property pursuant to the contract of sale.
  • In late 2018 the vendors requested the purchaser to temporarily ‘lift’ the caveat so that they could refinance.  The caveat was accordingly withdrawn and on 21 December 2018 a second caveat was lodged.
  • Between 12 June and 22 July 2019 the solicitors for both parties engaged in manoeuvres and negotiations including: the purchaser’s solicitor asserting that the vendors had previously agreed to a penalty free extension to 22 August 2019 and the vendors’ solicitor disagreeing; the vendors’ solicitors seeking more money; the purchaser’s solicitor stating his client had difficulty obtaining finance and asking that the vendors consider an extension of the settlement date and a deferred payment of part of the price.
  • On 22 July, following no settlement by 4.00 pm, the vendors’ solicitor at 5.19 pm served a 14 day notice of default and rescission.
  • On 9 August the vendors’ solicitor wrote to the purchaser’s solicitor confirming termination of the contract and forfeiture of the deposit.  No response was received.
  • On 20 August the vendors’ solicitor wrote again noting that as a result of the purchaser’s default his clients needed to re-sell and demanding withdrawal of the second caveat.  In response, on 22 August the purchaser withdrew the second caveat and his solicitor advised the vendors’ solicitor of this.  However, next day the purchaser’s solicitor wrote again stating that the withdrawal of the caveat was ‘without prejudice to any of the [respondent’s] rights under the contract or at all, which rights are fully reserved’.  The vendors’ solicitor responded that day stating that his clients were attempting to re-sell quickly and requesting that the purchaser not jeopardise or delay this re-sale.
  • On 27 August the vendors entered into a contract of re-sale to a third party.
  • On 3 September 2019 the purchaser lodged a third caveat claiming an interest in the property pursuant to the (original) contract of sale and next day his solicitor sent a notice to complete by 19 September 2019.  The vendors subsequently disputed the validity of these actions.  They subsequently applied under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) to remove the caveat.

The court (Beach, Kyrou and Kaye JJA) gave leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, holding –

  1. The power of the court under s. 90(3) was discretionary and so to obtain leave to appeal the applicants must establish material error by the judge in the exercise of that discretion of the kind described by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 35 CLR 499. [41]
  2. The principles applicable under s. 90(3) were as stated by Warren CJ in Piroshenko v Grojsman [2010] VSC 240, (2010) 27 VR 489, ie that the caveator must persuade the court that:

(1)  there is a probability on the evidence before the court that he or she will be found to have the asserted equitable rights or interest; and

(2)  that probability is sufficient to justify the caveat’s practical effect on the ability of the registered proprietor to deal with the property in accordance with normal proprietary rights.

But that these propositions were qualified by the fact that the discretion conferred by s. 90(3) was expressed broadly and enjoined the court to make such order as it thinks fit, and so the test adopted by the court ought not to restrict the statutory power.   Further, (1) and (2) are not mutually discrete: the exercise of the court’s discretion ultimately involved a synthesis of the Court’s conclusions on each. [42], [43], [75], [76]

  1. Where a purchaser had a right, in equity, to specifically enforce a contract of sale the purchaser thereby had an interest in the land, akin to an equitable interest, which may be protected by a caveat. [53]
  2. The parties had agreed that the specified settlement date be extended to 22 August 2019. Even if the vendors had insisted that the agent Mr Chan impose a condition on the extension of time, which he failed to do, for the purpose of the summary application under s. 90(3) it was appropriate to proceed on the basis that he had, at least, ostensible if not actual authority to enter into such an extension arrangement on behalf of the applicants.  Accordingly there was a serious issue to be tried that that ‘arrangement’ did not constitute a formal variation of the contract of sale (which would have been required to comply with s. 126 of the Instruments Act) but, rather, was a waiver of the stipulated settlement date of 22 July 2019 or founded an estoppel precluding the vendors relying on that date (instead of 22 August 2019). [55], [56]
  3. However, as to whether there was a serious issue to be tried that the purchaser, when he lodged the third caveat, had and continued to have the right to specifically enforce the contract, notwithstanding failure to pay the balance of purchase monies on 22 July 2019, as a consequence of which the vendors purported to rescind the contract –

(a)  Under the doctrine of election, a party confronted by two truly alternative or inconsistent rights or sets of rights (such as the right to avoid or terminate a contract and the right to affirm it and insist on performance of it) may lose one of those rights by election by acting in a manner which is consistent only with that party having chosen to rely on the other alternative or inconsistent right; [60]

(b) Ordinarily, a caveat removal application, being in the nature of an application for an interlocutory injunction, was not an occasion for the final determination of disputed factual issues, or of the substantive claims which the caveat sought to protect, and so it was not appropriate or necessary for the court to determine conclusively whether there was a binding election.  In the circumstances of the case, it was sufficient that there were strong grounds for concluding that the purchaser had made an unequivocal election not to retain his right to specific performance but, rather, to treat the contract of sale at an end, and pursue a claim for damages ([57], [59], [63], [67], [71]) for the following reasons –

(i)       the purpose of the lodgement of the second caveat was to protect the right of the purchaser to specific performance; [64]

(ii)   on 9 August the purchaser was placed on clear notice that the vendors took the position that the contract had been terminated.  Then, in the context of neither seeking to rebut nor respond to that position, he on 22 August withdrew the second caveat in response to the demand that he do so that the vendors could re-sell.   At this point it was strongly arguable that, in those circumstances, the purchaser’s conduct in withdrawing the caveat was an election no longer to claim a right to specific performance, which was an essential pre-condition to maintaining the second caveat.  That proposition was reinforced by the email of 23 August reiterating that the vendors were attempting to re-sell the property.  There was no assertion by the purchaser at any time before the re-sale on 27 August that the vendors were precluded from doing so because the purchaser had a right to specific performance; [65]

(iii)  the context in which the purchaser’s solicitor emailed on 23 August stating that the withdrawal of the caveat was done ‘without prejudice’ etc militated strongly against the proposition that the purchaser thus preserved his right to specific performance.  The only purpose served by the removal of the second caveat was to enable the applicants to re-sell the property, which re-sale would be directly inconsistent with any potential right of the purchaser to specific performance, and the email of 23 August did not suggest that the rights sought to be preserved included a right to specific performance or that the vendors could or should not re-sell. [66]

(c) For the same reasons there was a strong basis for concluding that the purchaser, by his conduct between 9 August and 27 August 2019, was estopped from contending that he continued to have a right to seek specific performance of the contract of sale.  He represented that he did not seek to maintain a caveatable interest in the property, so implying that he no longer sought to pursue a right to specific performance; by his withdrawal of caveat on 22 August, and his conduct at that time, he enabled the vendors to re-sell; if he was now permitted to depart from this representation the vendors would suffer detriment, namely, the loss of the contract of re-sale and exposure of them to a claim in damages (or other relief) by the new purchaser. [69], [71]

6.   The degree of likelihood of success in the proceeding was relevant to evaluation of the balance of convenience.  The above conclusions on election and estoppel were  of critical significance in an assessment of the balance of convenience against the fact that retention of the caveat would prevent completion of the contract of re-sale.   The balance of convenience accordingly favoured removal of the caveat. [73], [74], [77]

7.    The vendors’ further argument that, insofar as the parties had arranged, in August 2018, for the settlement date to be extended to 22 August 2019, nevertheless the conduct of the respondent between June 2019 and 22 August 2019 in some way rendered the extension of time nugatory, raised a question of fact which the court could not determine. [79]-[82]

Comment:

This case is interesting for the following reasons –

1.     In cases of contracts of sale the caveator/purchaser will often win or lose depending on whether there was a contract at all or if there had been whether it had been repudiated.  In this case the caveator lost because by the withdrawal of the second caveat he had given up the right to specific performance by affirmation or by estoppel.

2.    The court (paragraph 3 above) states that the right to specific performance is an “interest in land, akin to an equitable interest”.  The words “akin to” are interesting and are based mainly on Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 at 332–3.  Older cases simply said that a specifically enforceable contract of sale confers an equitable interest on the purchaser (eg Bunny Industries Ltd v FSW Enterprises Pty Ltd [1982] Qd. R. 712, based on earlier authorities). 

3.   The principle that on a caveat removal application it is not appropriate or necessary for the court to determine conclusively whether a particular legal event would happen (see paragraph 5(b) above) is normally applied in favour of caveators, ie that the caveator has only to show a serious question to be tried.  In this case the Court of Appeal turned this principle on its head by applying it in favour of the registered proprietor, ie it was sufficient that the registered proprietor showed only “strong grounds” for there being a binding election. 

Philip H. Barton
Owen Dixon Chambers West
7 April 2020

22. Caveats based on trusts alleged to arise in the domestic context – Muschinski v Dodds trust? Sale of land subject to caveat with requirement of retention of net proceeds to meet caveator’s future claim – Requirement in case of conflict of testimony that caveat be removed unless caveator commenced proceeding to establish interest – Power of courts exercising Family Law jurisdiction to alter property interests rests on legislation not on trusts – Family Law Act does not, of itself, give a party to a ‘marriage’ or a de facto relationship a caveatable interest though court order under that Act could have that effect – Comparison of procedures under TLA s. 90(3) and s. 89A – Indemnity costs against client and reserved against solicitor who lodged caveat.

Karan v Nicholas [2019] VSC 35 (7 February 2019) Daly AsJ.

McRae v Mackrae-Bathory [2019] VSC 298 (7 May 2019) Derham AsJ.  

Hermiz v Yousif [2019] VSC 160 (15 March 2019) Derham AsJ.

 

Karan is a case of a son with a caveatable interest in his parents’ property based on a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust.

McRae is a dispute between real or alleged domestic partners concerning two properties, involving a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust, with analysis by Derham AsJ of: (1) the balance of convenience where despite a caveatable interest it is necessary that a property be sold, and; in the case of a property not being sold, the law that, where a caveator has established a prima facie case but there is a conflict of testimony, the caveat would not be removed outright but may be ordered to be removed unless within a certain time a proceeding is issued to establish the caveator’s title.

Hermiz is a groundless claim for a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust by the mother of a registered proprietor’s child, which also: ventilated why the TLA s. 90(3) procedure should be taken rather than that under s. 89A, and; attracted an order for indemnity costs against the caveator and reserved the caveating solicitor’s liability also to pay them.  This case reiterates that the power of courts exercising Family Law jurisdiction to alter property interests rests on legislation not on the principles of constructive trusts; and that the Family Law Act does not, of itself, give a party to a ‘marriage’ or a de facto relationship a caveatable interest, although an order under that Act could have that effect.

Karan v Nicholas [2019] VSC 35 (7 February 2019) Daly AsJ.

The facts were –

  • Mrs Karan was the registered proprietor of a residential property. Her son Theo was registered proprietor of a neighbouring property where his parents and then his mother lived for many years.
  • She died, as administrator of her estate her other son Frank desired to sell the property, but Theo had caveated claiming an equitable estate in fee simple on the ground of an implied or constructive trust.
  • Frank applied under the Transfer of Land Act (TLA) s. 90(3) to remove the caveat. Theo was agreeable provided part of the sale proceeds was held in trust pending determination of his claim.
  • Theo alleged in substance:
    • residence in the property since 1988;
    • that Frank had used both properties to raise funds for business ventures on the basis of being responsible for the mortgage repayments which he subsequently ceased making leaving Theo to make some repayments;
    • payment of rates and outgoings including insurance;
    • expenditure on repairs, renovations and extensions;
    • in summary, total contributions of over $200,000.

Daly AsJ:

  1. Referred to a “Baumgartner constructive trust” (based on the High Court case of Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137, also known as a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust, based on the High Court case of that name: (1984) 160 CLR 583)). The elements of this trust are that a constructive trust for the holding of a beneficial interest in land in particular shares may arise regardless of agreement or intention where:

(a)   A relationship or joint endeavour has broken down without any blame attributable to any party to it;

(b)   There has been a financial contribution by one or both parties to the relationship or to the joint endeavour;

(c)   In these circumstances, and in all the circumstances, it would be unconscionable for one party to the relationship or joint endeavour to retain a benefit greater than that party’s contribution. [7]

  1. Held that Theo had established a serious question to be tried that such a trust existed from before 2012, on the basis of arguments that:

(a)   he and their parents were involved in a joint endeavour whereby he made contributions to the property, which enabled him and his family to live rent free at the property, and enabled his parents to live rent free at his property;

(b)   they all pooled their resources to facilitate the joint endeavour;

(c)   the joint endeavour ended without blame upon the death of the parents; and

(d)   it would be unconscionable for the estate to retain the benefit of his contributions. [8], [14], [16]

  1. Ordered removal of the caveat on condition that all or part of the net sale proceeds be retained to meet any claim by Theo, who was also required to commence a proceeding to pursue his claim within a specified time. [3(k)], [18]-[20]

McRae v Mackrae-Bathory [2019] VSC 298 (7 May 2019) Derham AsJ.  

The chronology was –

  • The plaintiff (Zachary) was the registered proprietor of a property at Albion acquired in 2004 and of a property at Lara acquired in 2013, each encumbered by the same mortgage.
  • In January 2019 the defendant (Rachel) caveated over each piece of land claiming an interest in the land “as chargee” under an implied, resulting or constructive trust.
  • In March 2019 Zachary entered into a contract to sell the Albion property to be settled in May 2019.
  • He applied for removal of the caveats under the TLA s. 90(3).
  • He alleged that:
    • in 2012 she gave birth to their twins, but he had never lived with her as a couple in a de facto relationship and there was no agreement between them sufficient to give rise to a constructive trust;
    • until recently the children lived with her during the week and with him every weekend;
    • in January 2019 she had attempted to kill him leading to an intervention order.
  • Rachel alleged that:
    • they had resided in a ‘full emotional and sexual’ committed de facto relationship between 2002 and 2019 and were publicly known as such;
    • they pooled their income for joint expenses;
    • the properties were acquired during the course of the relationship;
    • she made financial contributions to their purchase and development;
    • Zachary always ‘indicated’ to her that she had an interest in both properties and was entitled to a half share of them;
    • his evidence as to residence with the children was incorrect and that she had not assaulted him.

Derham AsJ held:

  1. The estate or interest claimed as chargee was likely to be the result of a legal error. [3]
  2. If Rachel’s testimony was accepted there was a sensible basis for, and a sufficient probability of, finding that there was a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust over both properties to the extent of her having an equitable estate in fee simple as a co-tenant with Zachary. This basis was: her direct contributions to the acquisition of the Albion property; her contributions to the maintenance and mortgage payments of both properties. [17]-[19]
  3. Accordingly, while it was neither necessary or appropriate to determine disputed questions of fact, Rachel had a sufficient likelihood of success justifying the practical effect of maintaining the caveat over the Albion property or of requiring deployment of most of the net sale proceeds in reducing the mortgage. [13], [20]
  4. The interaction between the strength of the caveator’s case and the balance of convenience was such that the lowest risk of injustice, whatever the outcome of the disputes, lay in removal of the caveat at settlement on the proviso that the net proceeds of the sale were (after payment of certain credit card debts – see below) applied to reduce the mortgage (Zachary also undertaking not to withdraw loan monies under the mortgage). This outcome preserved most of the benefit of Rachel’s caveatable interest.  To withhold this protection would do her irreparable harm if she succeeded in establishing her claimed interests, while to grant it would not greatly injure Zachary if her claims failed. [4], [21], [22], [24]
  5. However, certain of Zachary’s credit card debts were first to be paid out of the sale proceeds because most were incurred during the relationship alleged by Rachel and some had been incurred in completing the Lara property and so would ultimately benefit Rachel if her constructive trust claim succeeded. [4], [23]
  6. As regards the Lara property, it was clearly established law that where a caveator established a prima facie case but there was a conflict of testimony the court would not order outright removal of the caveat but may order removal unless steps were taken to establish the caveator’s title within a certain time. Accordingly the caveat would be ordered to be removed unless the caveator commenced proceedings to establish her title within a month. [5], [25], [26]
  7. Having regard to offers made by each side before the hearing, which were each to some extent appropriate, the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs fixed at $1,400, being disbursements incurred in issuing the originating process and paying the search fees incurred in putting forward exhibits to his affidavit in support. [27]

 

Hermiz v Yousif [2019] VSC 160 (15 March 2019) Derham AsJ.

The chronology was –

  • In 1998 the plaintiff (Hermiz) and the first defendant (Yousif) were sexually intimate leading to the birth of a child.  They ceased their relationship at about this time and Hermiz had never met the child.
  • Hermiz paid child support.  Yousif never provided him with any financial support.
  • Hermiz married his wife Dina in 2004.  In 2010 they purchased a residential property, became registered proprietors and subsequently cohabited there.
  • Yousif made no contribution to the property, or to any other asset owned by Hermiz, he made no promise about the property or declaration of trust or like arrangement concerning it, and no court order related to it.
  • In December 2018 Hermiz and Dina entered into a contract to sell the land with settlement due in February 2019.
  • In January 2019 Yousif lodged a caveat claiming an interest in the land pursuant to a court order under the Family Law Act.  There was no order giving such an interest.  The caveat was voluntarily removed.
  • On 1 February 2019 Yousif via a firm of solicitors lodged the caveat the subject of this proceeding claiming a freehold estate on the basis of an implied, resulting or constructive trust.  Hermiz’s solicitors wrote to Yousif’s solicitors expounding the absence of basis for the caveat and forshadowing an application for damages and indemnity costs.
  • Hermiz and Dina could not complete the sale, but gave the purchaser possession under a licence and also remained liable to keep up mortgage repayments.
  • Hermiz applied under the TLA s. 90(3) to remove the caveat.
  • Two days before the Supreme Court hearing Yousif filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court for a property order, in particular for an order that the net proceeds of sale of this property be held in trust pending final orders, supported by an affidavit including allegations referred to in 1 below.

Derham AsJ held:

  1. Yousif had not discharged the burden of establishing a serious question to be tried (in the sense of a prima facie case) of the interest in land claimed in the caveat.  There was insufficient evidence of a Muschinski v Dodds constructive trust: her allegation of cooking, cleaning and supporting Hermiz financially whilst he studied for his Australian medical qualification more than a decade before purchase of the land did not reveal that it is or would be unconscionable for him to deny her an interest in the land. [32]-[37], [40], [41]
  2. On the dissolution of marriage or the breakdown of a de facto or domestic relationship, the scope of the Federal Circuit Court’s power to alter property interests was determined by legislation, in this case the Family Law Act s. 90SM, rather than by the principles of constructive trusts.  The Family Law Act did not, of itself, give a party to a ‘marriage’ or a de facto relationship a caveatable interest, although an order under that Act could have that effect. [38], [39]
  3. The balance of convenience was also against Yousif. [42]
  4. Hermiz was justified in applying under the TLA s. 90(3) as opposed to using the administrative procedure in s. 89A. The very reason for the summary procedure under s. 90(3) was to enable an application that avoided the delay involved under s. 89A. [44], [45]
  5. Indemnity costs would be awarded against Yousif because: the nominated basis of resulting, implied or constructive trust for lodging the caveat was without merit, and; she was using the caveat process as a bargaining chip. [52], [53]
  6. Leave would be reserved to Hermiz to claim costs against the solicitors who lodged the caveat. [54]

3. Principles applicable to application to remove caveat under s. 90(3) of TLA

  • Absolute prohibition

  • Circumstances in which entitlement to payment for work on land caveatable

  • Injunction against future caveat

  • Amendment of caveat

  • Costs

  • Interest claimed being “implied, resulting or constructive trust”

  • Commentary

Yamine v Mazloum [2017] VSC 601 (3 October 2017) John Dixon J.

The timeline was –

Undated                         Plaintiff registered proprietor asks caveator to assist him to prepare property for sale.  Caveator subsequently alleges that in substance: the plaintiff asked him to work to finish his house and prepare it for auction; the caveator replied that a tremendous amount of work was involved which he could not even put a figure on, asked how he would be paid, and said that he would not help unless assured he could be paid; the plaintiff replied that he would be paid for his work from the proceeds of sale. 

March – 23 June 2017  Caveator moves into the property and allegedly fixes it for sale. 

8 July                               Property sold, settlement date 6 September, rescission notice served in September. 

26 July                             Caveat lodged, grounds of claim “implied, resulting or constructive trust”, estate or

interest claimed is a “freehold estate”, all dealings prohibited.

18 September                Following provision of information by caveator’s solicitors and inconclusive negotiations plaintiff foreshadows application to remove caveat, caveator offers withdrawal in return for $45,000 to be held in caveator’s solicitor’s trust account pending resolution of the dispute.

The plaintiff applied for removal of the caveat under the Transfer of Land Act 1958 s. 90(3). John Dixon J ordered removal of the caveat with costs. His Honour reasoned –

1. His Honour first recited certain standard principles, namely –

(1) The power under s. 90(3) was discretionary.

(2) Section 90(3) was in the nature of a summary procedure and analogous to the determination of interlocutory injunctions.

(3) The caveator bore the onus of establishing a serious question to be tried that the caveator had the estate or interest claimed. The caveator must show at least some probability on the evidence of being found to have the equitable rights or interest asserted in the caveat.

(4) The caveator must further establish that the balance of convenience favoured maintenance of the caveat until trial.

(5) As to the balance of convenience generally the court should take the course appearing to carry the lower risk of injustice if the court should turn out to have been wrong in the sense of declining to order summary removal where the caveator fails to establish its right at trial or in failing to order summary removal where the registered proprietor succeeds at trial.

(6) The stronger the case that there was a serious question to be tried, the more readily the balance of convenience might be satisfied. It was sufficient that the caveator showed a sufficient likelihood of success that in the circumstances justified the practical effect of the caveat on the registered proprietor’s ability to exercise normal proprietary rights. [15]

2. His Honour also noted authority for the proposition that “a caveat may only be lodged in a form commensurate to the interest it is designed to protect”. [16]

3. The argument that the caveator’s entitlement to be paid for his work on a quantum meruit was enforceable in equity by a constructive trust was invalid. The plaintiff did not accept any intention to charge or secure the land with the obligation to repay the cost of the work or to create any beneficial interest in it. The concept of salvage, deriving from Re Universal Distributing Co Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 171 at 174 – 5 per Dixon J, was inapplicable: the current case concerned property rights, not rights in insolvency and the property was preexisting and not converted into a fund for the benefit of claimants. There was only an oral agreement for services on a quantum meruit. [19], [24], [26] – [32]

4. If the caveator now evinced an intention to lodge a further caveat claiming an interest as chargee, an injunction would likely lie. [33]

5. No application to amend the caveat was made, and the discretion to amend would not have been exercised because:

(1) The application would have been to amend the interest claimed ie to chargee or equitable lienee, an amendment of interest claimed “not usually be[ing] permitted”, not merely to amend the grounds of claim or scope of protection. [35]

(2) The circumstances the grounds or interest claimed were erroneously stated was were relevant: the caveat was lodged not by an unrepresented person but by a solicitor certifying that he had taken reasonable steps to verify the identity of the caveator and had retained the evidence supporting the claim. [36]

(3) The court should not encourage the belief that caveats could be imprecisely formulated and then fixed up later: a caveat was in effect an interlocutory injunction by administrative act with possible serious consequences. Wrongly formulated caveats should not easily be tolerated. Caveats should not be used as bargaining chips. [37]-[38]

(4) The court should have regard to all of the considerations that arise on applying for removal of the caveat in the terms of the amendment sought. If this caveat was amended the caveatable interest claimed would still lack merit because even if the caveator’s version of the oral agreement was proved it would not create a charge or an equitable lien. [39] – [40]

6. His Honour not merely awarded costs but also reserved liberty to the plaintiff to make any application pursuant to r 63.23 as it may be advised against the first defendant’s solicitors. [44]

7. His Honour noted in passing that use of the phrase “implied, resulting or constructive trust”, which identified three different forms of trust, was “usually evidence of a degree of loose thinking”. [20]

Commentary –

1. His Honour deals with the principles applicable to s. 90(3) and amendment of caveats at length and touches on other interesting points now expanded on.

2. The stress on a caveat not imposing an absolute prohibition if inappropriate is expanded on in Lawrence & Hanson Group Pty Ltd v Young [2017] VSCA 172 to be the subject of a future Blog.

3. Other cases related to whether works on land will create a caveatable interest are –

• Walter v Registrar of Titles [2003] VSCA 122 at [18] – mere work and labour done not caveatable;

• Depas Pty Ltd v Dimitriou [2006] VSC 281 – a builder was found to have at most a contractual right to, and perhaps even an equitable interest in, half a joint venture’s net profit, but not a half interest in the land;

• An equitable lien will give rise to a proprietary and so caveatable interest, a foundational statement on equitable liens being that of Deane J in Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639 at 668. Caveat cases where no lien was established are: Western Pacific Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Murray [2000] VSC 436 and HG & R Nominees Pty Ltd v Caulson Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 126;

• In Popescu v A & B Castle Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 175 Ginnane J held that the only Romalpa clause conferring an equitable interest in land was one entitling the holder to enter upon the land to sever and remove the fixtures, and accordingly removed a caveat based on a clause simply providing that all materials used in a contract remained the supplier’s property until paid in full.

4. As to injunctions against future caveats, or the similar order that the Registrar not register any caveat without its leave or further order see also Westpac Banking Corporation v Chilver [2008] VSC 587, Lettieri v Gajic [2008] VSC 378, Marchesi v Vasiliou [2009] VSC 213; Wells v Rouse & Ors [2015] VSC 533.

  1. 5. The reservation of liberty to apply for costs against the solicitors ties in with an increasing judicial tendency to so order, eg Gatto Corporate Solutions Pty Ltd v Mountney [2016] VSC 752.

2. When does a caveat lapse and can the effect of lapse be avoided?

Tawafi v Weil [2017] VSC 643 (21 August 2017) Digby J.

Section 90(1)(e) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a caveat lapses as to land affected by a transfer upon the expiration of thirty days after notice by the Registrar that a transfer has been lodged for registration.  If within this period the caveator appears before a court and gives an undertaking or security the court may direct the Registrar to delay registration for a further period, or may make such other order as is just (s. 90(2)).  If the Registrar is of opinion that the doing of any act is necessary or desirable, then, if the act is not done within such time as the Registrar allows, the Registrar may refuse to proceed with any registration (s. 105(a)).

The timeline was –

11 April 2017         Plaintiff enters contract to purchase certain land. 

30 May                  Defendant caveats on the grounds of “part performed oral agreement” et cetera with the registered proprietor. 

26 June                  Settlement of the purchase without the caveat being removed. 

28 June (about)   Lodgment of the instrument of transfer (Transfer) for registration. 

29 June                 Registrar notifies caveator that pursuant to s. 90(1) the caveat would lapse on 31 July unless the caveator obtained an order pursuant to s. 90(2).  No order was obtained. 

2 August               Caveator commences a proceeding against registered proprietor inter alia claiming declarations of a proprietary interest in the land and for other relief in substance supporting the existence of the caveat and preventing registration of the Transfer.  An

agreement with the registered proprietor proprietor in early 2016 is alleged whereby the caveator agreed to lend $86,000 on security of this land, followed by that loan.  The second defendant was the conveyancer acting for both sides and the third defendant was the purchaser.  

3 August               The Registrar accordingly issues a Notice of Action prohibiting registration of further dealings until withdrawal of that notice or further order. 

16 August             Purchaser files Originating Motion seeking order for registration and Summons for dismissal of the caveator’s proceeding. 

Digby J ordered the Registrar to register the Transfer and remove the Notice of Action.  His Honour reasoned –

  1. The counting of days under s. 90(1) commenced from 30 June, being the day after the notice, thirty days elapsed on Sunday 30 July, and so the expiry date was 31 July. Accordingly the caveator was out of time.  It was irrelevant that s. 105(1) might have achieved a similar result in suspending the progress of registration. [24]-[25]
  2. The judicial approach to caveat removal applications was analogous to that in applications for injunction, ie the burden of proving the caveatable proprietary interest and maintaining the caveat was upon the caveator who must also establish on the balance of convenience that the caveat should be maintained until the trial of the contested proprietary interest. However, because the caveat had lapsed this case was not the usual caveat removal contest. [17]-[19]
  3. In any event the caveator had not raised a sufficient prima facie case of or arguable triable issue concerning the asserted proprietary interest. Further, the balance of convenience heavily favoured the purchaser because: the asserted triable issue was palpably weak; and the purchaser would be prejudiced by deferral of registration, particularly having entered a building contract to improve the property which could not be financed until the financier could register a mortgage. [28], [35]-[38]
  4. Indemnity costs were awarded against the caveator, particularly because of her very weak case, the purchaser having previously asked the caveator in writing to identify an arguable caveatable interest, without proper response, and given appropriate warning to the caveator. [43] – [59]