Blog 104. Costs where caveat withdrawn before hearing.

Ngo v Thai [2026] VSC 376, Ierodiaconou AsJ.

The facts were –

  • In 2020 the plaintiff (Ngo), who was the registered proprietor of a property, and the defendant (Thai) executed a Design Contract whereby Thai was to prepare plans and drawings for its redevelopment. They subsequently executed a Building Contract.
  • In 2023 Thai commenced a VCAT proceeding for breach of the Building Contract. Ngo counterclaimed.
  • In 2025 Thai issued a second VCAT proceeding, but evidence was led that neither Ngo or his solicitors were aware of this proceeding and service of it was not proved.
  • On 20 June 2025 Thai caveated over the property based on a purported outstanding invoice arising pursuant to the Design Contract (also the subject to the second VCAT proceeding). He did not until after the caveat’s removal inform Ngo’s solicitors that its basis was the second VCAT proceeding (as cls. 10 and 11 of the Design Contract authorised lodgement of a caveat as security for any monies payable under that contract) or to correct their assertions that it was based on the first VCAT proceeding.
  • Following letters in August and November 2025 demanding removal of the caveat a proceeding for its removal under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) was commenced on 30 January 2026 returnable on 10 February. Thai was emailed the initiating documents on 3 February, was texted by Ngo’s solicitors on 4 February and was personally served on 5 February.  That day after close of business he emailed that he was in the process of withdrawing the caveat which he did next day.   Ngo’s solicitors replied that indemnity costs would be sought and on the day of the hearing served Ngo’s affidavit in support of the Summons, sworn on 4 December 2025.

Ierodiaconou AsJ ordered that Thai pay Ngo’s costs of the proceeding on a standard basis, holding –

  1. The general rule was that costs should follow the event. Absent disqualifying conduct, the successful party should recover its costs even where not succeeding on all heads of claim. However the Rules of Court permitted significant flexibility in determining costs and accordingly in this determination the Court would do substantial justice between the parties.  Costs were usually awarded on a party/party basis [Note: now standard basis] but in special or unusual circumstances would be awarded on a solicitor/client or indemnity basis. [41], [42]
  2. Although, strictly speaking, Ngo had not discontinued the proceeding, it was useful to apply the principles on discontinuance by analogy, as he had obtained caveat removal without requiring judicial adjudication. Where a proceeding was discontinued: it was usually impracticable to assess who would have won the case; a distinction existed between cases in which one party, after litigating for some time, effectively surrendered, and cases where some supervening event, or settlement, so removed, or modified, the subject of the dispute that, although it could not be said that one side had simply won, no issue remained except that of costs.  In the former type of case it was common to award costs to the successful party.  In the latter there may be difficulty discerning where costs should be borne. [43], [44]
  3. Thai would be ordered to pay Ngo’s costs because: Ngo was successful; Thai had capitulated; Thai’s ignorance of his possible costs liability no excuse; Thai had been on notice of the proceeding since November 2025; whether the caveat would actually have been removed on a contested hearing was irrelevant; there was no basis to award Thai costs. [46]-[51], [54]
  4. Under Rules 63.28 and 63.20 of Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules the Court had a discretion to award costs other than on the standard basis. Special circumstances were required before it would award indemnity costs, being:
    • making an allegation, known to be false, of fraud;
    • making an irrelevant allegation of fraud;
    • conduct causing loss of time to the Court and to other parties;
    • commencement or continuation of proceedings for an ulterior motive;
    • contempt of court;
    • commencement or continuation of proceedings in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law;
    • failure until after the commencement of the trial, and without explanation, to discover documents the timely discovery of which would have considerably shortened, and very possibly avoided the trial.

Further, under the Civil Procedure Act 2010 s. 28(1), in exercising its discretion as to costs a court may take into account any contravention of the overarching obligations (ie those found in ss. 18, 19, 24 and 28). [60], [63]

  1. Costs would not be awarded on an indemnity basis, because:
    • no special circumstances existed, nor had Thai engaged in unmeritorious or deliberate improper conduct;
    • once served Thai did not fail to use reasonable endeavours to ensure that costs were reasonable and proportionate to the issues in dispute;
    • Ngo’s solicitors did not do a Titles Office search to ascertain the ground of the caveat. If they had so done it would likely have been evident that it was based on Thai’s claim in the second VCAT proceeding.  Armed with that information, the communications with Thai may have been more fruitful;
    • although Ngo’s solicitors informed Thai on 6 February, shortly after the caveat was removed, that Ngo would seek indemnity costs, no costs submissions were served, costs submissions were delayed until the morning of hearing, and then without proper explanation Ngo served an affidavit in support of the caveat removal. [66], [68]
  1. There was no basis for a gross sum costs order under Rule 63.07(2)(c). [69], [70]

Philip H. Barton

Owen Dixon Chambers West

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

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