Halliday v Halliday [2026] VSC 602, Barrett AsJ.

This case concerns a dispute between mother and daughter over a farm, raising a question of proprietary estoppel.   The facts were –

• The plaintiff (Sapphire), born in 1988, was the daughter of the defendant (Deborah) and Garnet Halliday who died in 2007. Garnet also had a son, Kaden.
• Garnet’s estate was worth approximately $31m. including a 70 hectare farm (Farm) then valued at $3m. His will left $50,000 to Kaden and the rest to Deborah.
• In August 2007 Deborah incorporated a company which traded breeding cattle.
• Kaden obtained further provision under Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958. Sapphire, then aged 18, received advice on making, but did not make, such an application.  In this Proceeding, issued on 2 April 2026, Sapphire pleaded:
  • About when Kaden’s Part IV claim was issued, Deborah promised her that, if Sapphire did not make a Part IV claim, she would give her: an interest in the Farm equivalent to $2m. (being Sapphire’s understanding of the value of Kaden’s claim), to be realised on the first of its sale, Sapphire’s permanent departure from it or Deborah’s death; and half of the cattle. This promise (the First Promise) was repeated;
  • It induced in Sapphire a reasonable assumption that what was promised would occur, and that her interest in the Farm would rise immediately (the First Assumption);
  • She relied on it to her detriment in not making a Part IV claim and thereby lost that statutory right and opportunities to: obtain $2m. – $3m. by settlement or judgment; purchase her own property or further investments, and; mitigate or resolve her financial and emotional dependency on Deborah;
  • Further or alternatively, about when the First Promise was made, Deborah further promised (denied by Deborah) that if the Farm was not sold and Sapphire assisted in the business Deborah would: continue to pay her health insurance; provide accommodation for her; allow her to live in Ryan’s Lodge once she had a family, and; leave by will her shares of the Farm and cattle and her shareholding in the company (the Second Promise);
  • The Second Promise induced in Sapphire a reasonable assumption that what was promised would occur if she did not make a Part IV claim, resided on the Farm with Deborah, and worked in the business for below minimum wages and conditions (the Second Assumption);
  • She relied on it to her detriment in not making a Part IV claim and so residing and working thereby losing (in addition to matters raised in the First Promise) the opportunity for a career and life outside the Farm.
• On 22 February 2008 Deborah made a codicil leaving the Farm to Sapphire.
• The title to the Farm was unencumbered from 2007 to 2023. In 2021 Deborah had a stroke increasing her difficulty in farming.
• In December 2022 Deborah engaged an estate agent to sell the Farm.
• In and around February 2023 emails passed between a legal firm and Deborah concerning sale.
• On 19 May 2023 Sapphire and Deborah exchanged texts in the course of which: Deborah stated “I hoped to pay you out like I paid Kaden” but that she just could not pay Sapphire out at the moment, and; Sapphire mentioned sums of $1.5 m. to $2 m. and texted “[y]ou could offer me 25 percent of the sale price”.
• In December 2023 Deborah borrowed $350,000 from Mss Cassin and Bodey secured by a first mortgage over the Farm registered next day. In January 2024 this mortgage was varied to secure a further $150,000.
• On 1 July 2025 Sapphire caveated over the Farm on the ground of estoppel, claiming a freehold estate, the prohibition being absolute.
• On 18 August 2025 Deborah borrowed $100,000 from Mr Frankel for 18 months “to alleviate cashflow issues”. He caveated that day claiming an interest as mortgagee.
• On 9 February 2026 Deborah borrowed $444,000 from Juel Litigation Finance Pty Ltd (Juel) for personal expenses and legal costs. It caveated claiming an interest as chargee.
• Deborah’s debts were now approximately $1m.
• On 26 February the Registrar of Titles issued a notice under the Transfer of Land Act (TLA) s. 89A(3) leading to Sapphire issuing her proceeding. In it she further pleaded –
  • Deborah had “evinced an intention to act contrary to the First Promise and resile from the First Assumption” by: engaging the estate agent; the emails in and around February 2023; the 19 May 2023 texts; Deborah saying “the farm is mine”; the December 2023 mortgage, and; the s. 89A(3) notice.
  • It would be unconscionable for Deborah to act contrary to First Promise and resile from the First Assumption by selling the Farm, and she was estopped from denying that Sapphire was entitled to two-thirds of either the beneficial interest in the Farm subject to existing mortgages or the equivalent net sale proceeds. This was particularised as: a Part IV claim by Sapphire yielding about $2m. and, the Farm being valued at $3 m., if this sum was treated as invested in it, Sapphire’s interest was two-thirds.
  • Deborah had “evinced an intention to act contrary to the Second Promise and resile from the Second Assumption” by: the same matters as for the First Promise and First Assumption; selling cattle allocated to Sapphire and refusing her residence in Ryan’s Lodge following the birth of Deborah’s only grandchild.
  • It would be unconscionable for Deborah to act contrary to Second Promise and resile from the Second Assumption by selling the Farm and she was estopped from denying that Sapphire was entitled to Deborah’s interest in the Farm, the net proceeds of sale of that interest, and equitable compensation.
• Deborah issued this proceeding under the TLA s. 90(3) seeking removal of the caveat. Her solicitor deposed to being instructed that:
  • Deborah had financial pressures caused by business loss.
  • Mss Cassin and Bodey had requested repayment of their overdue loan plus approximately $15,000 interest, and could sue for this.
  • Without selling Deborah could not repay mortgage debts, so risking a mortgagee’s sale, and could not support herself.
  • The Farm was worth $14 m. – $15 m.
• Sapphire swore an affidavit generally in support of her pleading.

 

Barrett AsJ. ordered removal of the caveat on condition that part of the net proceeds of sale were paid into Court or trust, holding –

1. The principles of proprietary estoppel were:
   1. a clear and unequivocal promise to the promisee who relied on it;
   2. a reasonable person in the promisor’s position must have expected or intended this reliance by action, omission or course of conduct;
   3. the promisee relying by acting or omitting to act in a general way expected;
   4. detriment to the relying promisee if the promise was unfulfilled;
   5. if (a) – (d) existed the Court may provide redress in accordance with the requirements of conscience by reference to all circumstances. There would not be a disproportionate making good of the assumption: if the detriment was small and readily quantifiable monetary compensation was likely appropriate; if involving life-changing decisions with irreversible consequences fulfilment of the promise was the more likely relief.

[38], [39]

2. While the pleading and Sapphire’s affidavit evidence were not entirely consistent there was at its highest a prima facie case of proprietary estoppel in her favour, notwithstanding:

• 1. Inconsistency between the First and Second Promises, the First being merely for a monetary sum, the Second for the whole Farm;
  2. Deborah’s argument that the alleged promise to devise the Farm was conditional because a will may be revoked. To the contrary, it may be clear that the assurance was not just one of present (revocable) intention but was tantamount to a promise.  Whether words were reasonably understood as intended to be binding depended upon the circumstances of their making, the parties’ relationship and perhaps the stage of life of their making, largely to be resolved at trial;
  3. Sapphire’s imprecision concerning her possible investments, their enhancement, her career trajectory and possible alternative income. Nonetheless, if accepted, her evidence prima facie established detrimental reliance, most obviously in her working on the Farm for years for under award wages because of Deborah’s promises.  The question of possible final relief, moulded to prevent the detriment, was a separate question.

[42], [44], [46], [49], [52]

3. The merits of Sapphire’s claim were relevant to maintenance of the caveat. As to this:

• 1. The First and Second Promises were somewhat inconsistent, as stated in 2(a) above. The current material, being text messages, was more consistent with a claim to a monetary sum and so the First Promise was better supported than the Second;
  2. As to the reasonableness of Sapphire’s reliance, the alleged promises were made when Deborah had long expectancy of life during which its vicissitudes may force a sale;
  3. These matters may also be relevant to appropriate relief. Even if there was a promise for the whole Farm, relied on, a Court may ultimately determine that it not be unconscionable for Deborah to resile from it by selling the Farm for housing and healthcare needs;
  4. The Court may take into account that the First Promise was alleged to be for an amount equivalent to $2m. yet the Farm was now worth $14m. to $15m. Further, in her text messages of 19 May 2023 Sapphire mentioned sums of $1.5 m. to $2 m. and also texted “[y]ou could offer me 25 percent of the sale price”.

[36], [42], [53]-[57]

4. The balance of convenience required removal of the caveat with $2,544,000 of the proceeds of sale being paid into Court or a trust account pending finalisation of litigation, because:

• 1. Deborah was under financial pressure, could not service loans, the business was running at a loss, and her pressing age and health needs were most effectively met by sale;
  2. Having regard to what is set out in paragraph 2(a) concerning the First Promise and the text messages as to payment of part of the sale proceeds, and even then of $1.5m. to $2m., Sapphire’s claim to the whole Farm was weaker than to the equivalent of a $2m. interest in it. There was accordingly no particular imperative to hold the Farm;
  3. If Juel and Mr Frankel were paid out of the sale proceeds Sapphire would sustain prejudice through losing priority to them, but most likely only if she was found entitled to the whole Farm unencumbered rather than to the better supported claim to a lesser portion. Because Deborah’s debts were low compared with the value of the Farm sale would not cause Sapphire significant risk of detriment;
  4. What is set out in paragraph 3(c) above may dictate relief less than a gift of the unencumbered Farm;
  5. The codicil was consistent with the Second Promise to devise the Farm. The evidence suggested that if the Farm was sold Deborah intended to use the proceeds to extinguish debts, pay living expenses and purchase a less expensive residence.  It was unclear that she otherwise intended to dissipate them.  The amount of $544,000 would at least represent the potentially lost priority and Sapphire would remain at liberty to seek to restrain any expenditure by Deborah if there was a proper basis;
  6. The amount of $2 m. better addressed the balance of convenience than an amount which was two thirds of the current value of the Farm.

[63]-[70]

 

Philip H. Barton

Owen Dixon Chambers West

Thursday, November 12, 2026