Howitt v Maxim Built Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 650, Hannon J.
The facts were –
- The first defendant (Maxim Built) commenced a Supreme Court proceeding (the main proceeding) against parties including Mr Livingston, MH & ML Developments Pty Ltd (MHML) and MH Developments Pty Ltd. Mr Howitt was a director and shareholder of both defendant companies. Livingston’s wife was a director of MHML. Maxim Built alleged that Livingston was a shadow director of these companies.
- In the main proceeding Maxim Built alleged that Livingston, its construction manager, in breach of fiduciary duty, paid contractors on its behalf for work on property developments, being developments for the personal benefit of Livingston or of companies associated with Howitt, which companies knowingly assisted in Livingston’s breach of fiduciary duty.
- Before issue of the main proceeding, MHML issued two proceedings to remove caveats lodged by Maxim Built over three properties which it owned. The first proceeding was discontinued and the second failed on 29 April 2026 on both serious question to be tried and balance of convenience grounds. The serious question found by Gray J. was based on the alleged fraud of Livingston (on behalf of MHML) and consequent constructive trust, and on an equitable charge given by Mrs Livingston, MHML’s director, over the properties. However, Gray J. left this proceeding on foot because of a possible further caveat removal application to facilitate sale of one of the properties.
- On 1 May 2026 Maxim Built caveated over a property in Sunshine of which Howitt was registered proprietor (the Property) on the ground of implied, resulting or constructive trust with an absolute prohibition on dealings.
- On 20 and 28 May 2026, in MHML’s second caveat removal proceeding, Harris J ordered removal of the caveats on settlement of sales, with the net proceeds of sale being paid into Court. Two properties sold with just over $1m. being paid into Court.
- In September Howitt commenced the current proceeding under the Transfer of Land Act s. 90(3) seeking removal of the caveat over the Property.
- Maxim Built sought to rely on a then unsworn affidavit to be filed in the main proceeding exhibiting a draft proposed Amended Statement of Claim seeking to join Howitt as a party, It pleaded that Livingston wrongly engaged subcontractors on Maxim Built’s behalf at the Property for Howitt’s benefit with Howitt knowingly assisting in that breach of fiduciary duty.
- There was evidence that: the Property was purchased in 2024 for $1.2m.; the first registered mortgage secured a facility for $1.8m. with a current balance of just over $1.6m., and; Howitt sought to refinance to raise $356,000 to complete the Property’s development.
Hannon J. ordered that the caveat be removed with costs, holding –
- Only a legal or equitable interest in land could sustain a caveat. An equitable interest was a proprietary interest recognised by equity but not by the common law. A mere equity was a right, usually of a procedural character, ancillary to some right of property, limiting or qualifying it in some way. It was not a proprietary interest in land. [23]
- Maxim Built’s alleged interest in the Property did not constitute a resulting or implied trust. [25]
- Liability under the second limb of Barnes v Addy ((1874) LR 9 Ch. App. 244), ie “knowing assistance”, required:
-
- the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by the fiduciary (as trustee or otherwise);
- a ‘dishonest and fraudulent design’ on the part of the fiduciary;
- assistance by the third party in that design; and
- knowledge on the part of the third party of the circumstances constituting that design.
Barnes v Addy liabilities were personal fault-based liabilities, exposing the person to whom they applied to personal, to in personam, liabilities, so confining the plaintiff to a personal remedy. A dishonest assister or knowing recipient could not: invest, sell, or deal with the trust property, or; lawfully promise to transfer title. Their liability was only as an accessory to a breach.
[26], [31]
- A distinction existed between two categories of constructive trustee. The first category, so-called “institutional trustees” were those who had lawfully and voluntarily assuming fiduciary obligations. This was a proprietary constructive trust. In the second category a constructive trust was imposed on someone (a “remedial trustee”) who never assumed or intended to assume the obligations of a trustee but instead exposed himself or herself to the intervention of equity by participating in the unlawful application of trust assets: in this case the term “constructive trust” was (unlike a true trust, which was concerned with property and property interests) used as a label for a personal remedy against wrongdoer, who never had proprietary rights to the relevant assets. [29]-[31]
- Maxim Built’s claim that Howitt was liable as a constructive trustee, to account to it or to pay compensation for benefits he received due to Livingston’s alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, ie to trace the money paid by it to improve the Property into the Property, whether founded on alleged “knowing assistance” in Livingston’s breaches of fiduciary duty (or for that matter based on the first limb of Barnes v Addy, which imposed liability on a third party who received trust property with notice of the trust) did not establish an equitable and accordingly caveatable interest in the Property. It was a remedial trust, ie one arising once the remedy of constructive trust was conferred and did not exist beforehand.
[25], [27], [28], [31], [33], [34], [36], [37], [40], [49], [50], [51]
- In any event the Barnes v Addy claim in this case was tenuous. Under either limb of Barnes v Addy the plaintiff must prove the element of the knowledge of the accessory, whether actual or constructive, as the case may be. The proposed pleading of “knowing assistance” by Howitt did not identify the material facts necessary to support any allegation of him having actual or constructive knowledge. [53], [54], [60], [61]
- The balance of convenience favoured removal of the caveat because –
-
- the strength of the caveator’s case on the merits was relevant and clearly pointed towards removal;
- the quantum of the claim proposed against Howitt, being $415,940, may be inconsistent with a recent demand by another entity related to Maxim Built;
- the evidence of value and borrowings enabled the Court to infer that the Property’s value exceeded the amount actually or proposed to be secured, but did not permit safe conclusions on the value of Howitt’s equity in it. The extent of possible funds to meet Maxim Built’s claim, whatever its proper quantum, was unclear, but it was clear that the caveat prevented Howitt refinancing and so completing the development and facilitating his debt repayment. The absolute prohibition on dealing with the Property represented by a caveat was excessive in the face of the interest that it protected.
[62]-[67]
Philip H. Barton
Owen Dixon Chambers West
Wednesday, November 18, 2026